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Abstract
This Comment examines the latest developments of the banana trade dispute, which threatens
to disrupt, the economies of Third World countries and international relations on a general scale.
Part I reviews the background of the legal treaties and the international organizations involved
in the dispute, as well as the parties involved, and the dispute’s basic history. Part II examines
the dispute’s procedural history, as presented before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and
also highlights recent developments. Part III evaluates the WTO’s legal rulings and analyzes key
aspects of the banana dispute. Part III also suggests that while the system of preferential treatment,
granted to the developing countries, contradicted the language of certain GATT provisions, the
principles behind the preferential treatment complied with the tenets of international economic
development law; therefore the treatment was not per se wrong. Part III suggests that the present
regime should remain for a short transition period until the EU implements an alternative system.
Finally, Part III suggests the most feasible alternative is a regionalized cooperative agreement
between the EU and the developing countries. This Comment concludes that under international
development law, globalization should be advanced with preferential treatment, in order to give
participants, at various stages of economic prosperity, the same opportunity to integrate themselves
and grow in the international trade community.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalisation-I wish the word had never been invented. It's
not something which politicians or political parties dreamed
up one day. It is a process which dates back to the first time
men emerged from caves, walked upright and decided to
have a look at what was going on around them.'
The on-going banana trade war concerns U.S. and Latin
American objections of the European Union's ("EU") preferen-
tial treatment towards banana exports received from developing,
third world nations over Latin American-produced bananas.2
The United States and Latin America see this preferential treat-
ment as illegal and discriminatory.' The banana regime drew
out conflicting opinions about the advancement of globaliza-
tion, setting international economic development theory4
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to dedi-
cate this Comment to my mother, Lauretta St. Brice Joseph, my stepfather, Gualbert B.
Louisy, my father Louis, my sister Maureen, my nephew Meshach, and my niece Yasmin.
I would like to thank my friends for their unconditional support and encouragement,
as well as the editors and members of the Fordham International LawJournal for their
extremely valuable feedback, assistance, and patience.
1. See WJ"O's Moore Calls for Debt Write-Off for Poorest Countries, available at http://
sg.dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines (Apr. 14, 2000) (quoting Mike Moore, Director-
General of World Trade Organization in speech National Press Club in Washington
D.C.).
2. See Rodrigo Bustamante, The Need for a GA7Y" Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the
United States Cannot Stand the European Community's Banana Import Regime, 6 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 533, 533 (1997) (remarking that preferential regime is being challenged
on various institutional grounds including violations of General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") as well as infringement on European Community Member States'
sovereignty as per Treaty on European Community).
3. Id.
4. See LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 4 (Petar Sarcevic & Hans Van Houtte
eds., 1990) (stating that international development law regulates relationship between
sovereign but economically unequal States and it is not considered law of Third World,
but international law of modern era); see also HANS VAN HOUTI'E, THE Lxw OF INTERNA-
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against free market capitalism principles under the umbrella of
international law,5 in order to ascertain what place preferential
treatment has in international trade.6 Globalization requires the
representation of all competing nations to come together on a
global scale and compete in a more cooperative manner.' Dur-
ing the last decade, the attainment of globalization, through
preferential treatment within the world of international trade,
became more complex and problematic.8 Supporters of a sys-
tem of preferential treatment view such treatment as an advance-
ment of international development that calls for a balance of
trade among all who wish to participate but are on unequal eco-
nomic footing.9 Those more apt to subscribe to classic interna-
tional law assert that globalization has not positively impacted all
TIONAL TRADE 36-37 (1995) [hereinafter VAN HoUTE] (explaining that international
development law is based on two principles: developing countries have right to devel-
opment; and developed countries have duty of solidarity towards developing countries
as per Charter of Economic Rights and Duties).
5. See LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that inter-
national law is based on rule of sovereign equality); see also VAN HOUTrE, supra note 4,
at 36 (explaining that under tenets of sovereign equality, every state is equal and sover-
eign under law, regardless of that state's political or social system; each state can struc-
ture its own state and economic arrangement).
6. See generally Phedon Nicolaides, Preferences for Developing Countries: A Critique, 19
J. OF WORLD TRADE 373, 376-77 (1985) (discussing developing countries' involvement in
globalization process under conflicting views of international economic development
principles and free market capitalism principles).
7. See Michael Moore, Challenges For the Global Trading System in the New Millennium,
Sept. 28, 1999, at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres99_e/PR39_e.htm [here-
inafter Challenges] (stating that WTO's central policy is to make prosperity that flows
from globalization reachable to people; governments must cooperate in trade, invest-
ment, and financial arenas to secure maximum benefits from international specializa-
tion, while simultaneously leaving necessary space to address any fallout from change
affecting certain groups).
8. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE ACP COUNTRIES ON THE EVE OF THE 21sT CENTURY-CHALLENGES AND
OPTIONS FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP, CHAPTER I-GLOBAL CHANGES AFFECTING ACP-EU RE-
LATIONS (1996). See Michael Moore, Trade, Poverty and the Human Face of Globalization,
June 16, 2000, at http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/spmme/spmm32-e.htm [here-
inafter Human Face] (acknowledging that globalization is controversial and critics be-
lieve problem with globalization is that it lacks human face); see also, Michael Moore,
The Backlash Against Globalization?, Oct. 26, 2000, at http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/spmme/spmm39_e.htm [hereinafter Backlash] (acknowledging backlash
against liberalism).
9. See Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 375-76; see alsoJackJ. Chen, Going Bananas-How
The W17O Can Heal the Split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283,
1304 (1995) (stating that developing countries must be treated differently in order to
function on equal footing with developed countries and that developing countries will
lag behind in economic development unless given time to stimulate their economies).
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who participate in international trade.'" To the contrary, critics
argue that preferential treatment only serves to mar the con-
cepts of free market capitalism and trade. 1 Critics also maintain
that if all trade participants were on equal footing, there would
not be a need for trade.' 2 Trade survives on the concept of eco-
nomic disparity of its participants, which determines the prices
of goods.' 3 Where one country has the competitive advantage to
produce a particular product, another country should gain its
competitive advantage in the production of another commod-
ity.'4 Detractors also blame globalization for increasing the in-
come disparity between wealthy and poor countries, and view
globalization as an economic threat.15
This Comment examines the latest developments of the ba-
nana trade dispute, which threatens to disrupt, the economies of
Third World countries and international relations on a general
scale. Part I reviews the background of the legal treaties and the
international organizations involved in the dispute, as well as the
parties involved, and the dispute's basic history. Part II exam-
ines the dispute's procedural history, as presented before the
World Trade Organization 16 ("WTO"), and also highlights re-
cent developments. Part III evaluates the WTO's legal rulings
and analyzes key aspects of the banana dispute. Part III also sug-
gests that while the system of preferential treatment, granted to
10. See Challenges, supra note 7 (stating that WTO detractors blame globalization
for widening gap between wealth of developed and developing countries and that de-
veloping countries are economically worse off than they were 20 to 30 years ago).
11. See Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 377-78; see also Chen, supra note 9 (stating that
only way to encourage ACP development is to place them in as close to free market
economy possible and force them to streamline their businesses and learn to compete
with more developed nations).
12. See Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 377 (arguing that if all trading nations pos-
sessed same kind of labor, capital, and production functions, concept of trade would be
unnecessary).
13. See id. at 378 (stating that in international trade it is important to ascertain how
much of one genre of goods may be exchanged for another genre of goods; compara-
tive advantage determines what should be produced and traded by particular nation).
14. Id. See Hale Sheppard, The Lom6 Convention in the Next Millennium: Modification
of the Trade/Aid Package and Support for Regional Integration, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 84,
95 (1998) (stating that opponents to regime suggest that developing countries should
diversify and expand what they export to products or areas in which they hold competi-
tive advantage).
15. See Challenges, supra note 7.
16. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
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the developing countries, contradicted the language of certain
GATT provisions, the principles behind the preferential treat-
ment complied with the tenets of international economic devel-
opment law; therefore the treatment was not per se wrong. Part
III suggests that the present regime should remain for a short
transition period until the EU implements an alternative system.
Finally, Part III suggests the most feasible alternative is a region-
alized cooperative agreement between the EU and the develop-
ing countries. This Comment concludes that under interna-
tional development law, globalization should be advanced with
preferential treatment, in order to give participants, at various
stages of economic prosperity, the same opportunity to integrate
themselves and grow in the international trade community.
I. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE
BANANA REGIME
The principal body of law at the center of the banana dis-
pute is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 7
("GATT"). GATT contains a commitment from its Member
States to reduce tariffs and regulate government interference
that constrains or misconstrues international trade. 18 GATT was
improved upon by the establishment of the WTO during the
Uruguay Round negotiations.19 The creation of the WTO served
as a turning point in GATT's history.2" The WTO held that the
primary responsibility for administering a dispute settlement sys-
tem where Member State parties to GATT and to other agree-
ments could seek to enforce their respective rights. 2 ' GATT pro-
vided preferential treatment to developing nations, in response
to their desire to liberalize their market access.22 GATT granted
this preferential treatment in order to recruit developing coun-
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
18. See Bustamante, supra note 2, at 552 (stating that in order to comprehend dis-
pute settlement mechanism, one must accept GATT's general premise, which is to pre-
vent governments from imposing or continuing to impose restraints or distortions on
international trade).
19. Id.
20. See Bustamante, supra note 2, at 552 n.104 (stating that Agreement forming
WTO signified new era in GATT's history).
21. Id. at 552.
22. ROBERT E. HUDEC, TRADE POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 41 (1987).
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tries as Member States.23
A. The WTO
During the first half of the twentieth century, the world was
in the middle of an ongoing depression. 24 The United States
and the United Kingdom entered into discussions to set up the
International Trade Organization 25 ("ITO") to alleviate the de-
pression by advancing economic development through trade, in-
vestment, and business regulation. 26 At the same time, a num-
ber of countries negotiated a set of trade tariff concessions and
regulations that became part of GATT.27 The signatories drafted
GATT as an interim trade liberalizing mechanism until the actu-
alization of the ITO.28 The ITO was never established leaving
GATT as the only agreement to regulate international trade.29
1. Former System
Originally, the signatories intended GATT to serve as a mul-
tilateral trade agreement that eventually would become the cen-
tral point for international government cooperation with regard
to trade.3 0 GATT aimed to act as a trade liberalizing mecha-
nism.31 GATT fulfills three primary functions for the interna-
23. Id.
24. See AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1 (Konstantinos Ada-
mantopoulos ed., 1997).
25. See LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 4, at 210 (explaining that
International Trade Organization was proposed at United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, held from November 21, 1947, to March 1948, in Cuba, to
promote postwar-economic reconstruction and trade by re-establishing and expanding
world trade with International Monetary Fund and World Bank).
26. See id. (claiming that United States and United Kingdom, at end of World War
II, met to discuss development of system to regulating world trade to avoid tragic eco-
nomic events like that of 1930s).
27. See ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 24, at 1-2 (ex-
plaining that during 1947, significant tariff reduction negations were held that resulted
in binding concessions affecting about US$10,000,000,000 in trade).
28. See ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 24, at 2 (explain-
ing that GATT was not supposed to be independent legal instrument, but interim mea-
sure to effectuate ITO commercial policy provisions).
29. Id.
30. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 87. See GATT (stating that GATT was effected on
January 1, 1948).
31. See Richard Lyons, European Banana Controversy, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 165, 179
(1994) (noting that GATT's purpose is to diminish protectionist barriers among con-
tracting parties).
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tional trade community. 2 GATT provides a system of rules to
regulate the trade of goods. 33 GATT provides a means to resolve
trade disputes.3 4 Finally, GATT facilitates negotiations concern-
ing matters of international trade.35
There are three basic sets of rules under GATT.36 The first
set of rules governs the application of trade rules.37 Article II
allows the use of tariffs as a limit to trade, but not in excess of
agreed upon levels. 8 Article XI bans the use of quotas and
other non-tariff trade restrictions, subject to certain excep-
tions. 39 These exceptions include the use of quantitative restric-
tions as permitted under Article XIII.4 °
32. GEORGE A. BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
952 (1993).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 954 (explaining that dispute settlement is GATTT's principle func-
tion; if GATT member cannot solve dispute with another GAT[ member through con-
sultations, then dispute is brought before appointed panel of international trade ex-
perts).
35. See id. (explaining that GATT serves as multilateral forum to negotiate tariff
reductions and trade agreements).
36. Id.
37. See id. (stating that GATI provides forum to negotiate international trade is-
sues).
38. See GATT art. II (explaining that use of tariffs arises from premise that tariffs
are least misconstruing trade restriction because they favor most efficient exporter and
because they do not bar imports; they only increase exporters' costs); BERMAN, supra
note 32, at 952 (explaining that tariffs are common import restriction used in com-
modity trade, which serve to protect domestic industries against competitive, foreign
imports); JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS- LEGAL PROBLEMS 376
(3rd ed. 1995) (noting that GATT stipulates that tariffs are more favorable to importing
government because tariffs do not require government subsidization, tariffs are easier
to create, tariffs do not require licensing system, tariffs allow government to keep profit
it created, and tariffs offer little trade protection to importers); Jackson supra at 377
(noting foreign importer needs to be almost self-sufficient in order export to country
that imposes tariffs); id. (noting, however, GATT recognizes that, unlike use of tariff
system, quota restrictions allow importing government to plan how much of particular
product can be imported).
39. GATT art. XI. Article XI states
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be'instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product... or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Id. para. 1.
40. GATT art. XIII. Article XIII(5) states that "[tihe provisions of this Article shall
apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any contracting party, and, in so far
as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export restrictions." Id.;
see JACKSON, supra note 38, at 376 (arguing that quantitative restrictions are most uti-
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The second set of rules is non-discrimination rules. 4 Arti-
cle I, commonly known as the most-favored-nation 42 ("MFN")
clause, bans discrimination against imported goods.43 The MFN
clause asserts that any advantage granted to the goods of one
country must be given to like products imported from all other
countries.44 One important exception to this rule grants prefer-
ential tariff treatment to developing countries. 45  The Genera-
lized System of Preferences 46 ("GSP") and the Lom6 Conven-
lized form of import restraints and go even further than tariff in specifying amount of
particular good that may enter country at given time).
41. See BERMAN, supra note 32, at 953.
42. GATT art. I. GATT Article I(1) states:
[w]ith respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed or in con-
nection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports.. and with respect to all rules and
formalities in connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage,
favour privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like products originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
43. Id.
44. GATT art. I. SeeJACKSON, supra note 38, at 436 (arguing that MFN clause is
viewed as foundation of rules under GATT). The MFN clause exists in several other
treaties besides GATT and specifically has been cited as a treaty-based concept by the
United Nations International Law Commission, Jackson, supra note 38, at 438, 444.
45. See GATT art. 1(2) (stating that Article 1 (1) will not require elimination of pref-
erences involving import duties and charges under specified contingencies). But see
ROMAN GRYNBERG, NEGOTIATING A FAIT ACCOMPLI: THE WTO INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE
LOMII CONVENTION TRADE PROVISIONS AND THE ACP-EU NEGOTIATIONS, ECDPM, WORK-
INC PAPER No. 38 (Sept. 1997) (stating that although WTO has accepted that there is
justification for departure from MFN reductions in tariffs that is allowed for developing
countries, MFN principles remain ideological nucleus of WTO law).
46. See Waivers of Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) 24-26 (1972) [hereinafter GSP] (recognizing that contracting par-
ties' principal goal is to promote trade and export earnings of developing countries in
furtherance of developing countries' economic development). The GSP states:
(a) That without prejudice to any other Article of the General Agreement, the
provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period often years to the extent
necessary to permit developed contracting parties, subject to the proce-
dures set out hereunder, to accord preferential tariff treatment to prod-
ucts originating in developing countries and territories with a view to ex-
tending to such countries and territories generally the preferential tariff
treatment referred to in the Preamble to this Decision, without according
such treatment to like products of other contracting parties-[p]rovided
that any such preferential tariff arrangements shall be designed to facili-
tate trade from developing countries and territories and not to raise barri-
ers to the trade of other contracting parties ....
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tion4 v ("Lom6" or "Lom6 waiver") first granted such preferential
treatment to developing countries.48 Article XX1V, another ex-
ception to Article I, provides for the formation of free trade ar-
eas and customs unions.49 In part, Article XXIV permits free
trade areas where the contracting parties have eliminated all
trade restrictions.5 °
The legal rationale behind preferential treatment given by
such exemptions, like Article XXIV, is premised on the Enabling
Clause. 51 The Enabling Clause permits the preferential tariff
and non-tariff treatment from developed countries, reciprocal
preferences between developing countries, and special preferen-
tial treatment in favor of least-developed countries.52 The final
set of GATT rules allow parties to enforce trade restrictions
under stipulated circumstances.53
47. ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, oJ. (L 25), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975)
[hereinafter Lom6 I].
48. See JACKSON, supra note 38, at 436 (explaining that GATT approved GSP in
June of 1971 allowing developed contracting parties to give more favorable treatment
to products for developing countries versus those exported from developed countries
for period of ten years); Sheppard, supra note 14, at 84 (explaining Lom6 Convention,
five year renewable agreement that grants preferential treatment to developing coun-
tries and EU).
49. See GATT art. XXIV(5) (stating that "the provisions of [GATT] shall not pre-
vent, as between territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or
a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation
of a customs union or a free-trade area").
50. GATT art. XXIV(8) (b). Article XXIV(8) (b) states:
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constitu-
ent territories in products originating in such territories.
Id.
51. See Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Partic-
ipation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Enabling
Clause]. Article I states that "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General
Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment
to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting par-
ties." VAN HouTrE, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that enabling clause forms legal justifi-
cation for preferential treatment of developing countries).
52. See Enabling Clause.
53. See generally GATT arts. VI, XII, XVI, XVIII(b), and XIX. Article VI(2)states:
In order to offset or prevent dumping, contracting party may levy on any
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the mar-
gin of dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this Article,
the margin of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1.
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2. Current System
The growth in international services and trade, as well as the
increasing interdependency of international economies, high-
lighted GATT's inherent limitations.5 4 During the 1994 Uru-
guay Round negotiations,55 the breadth of GATT expanded with
the creation of the WTO. 56 GATT member nations automati-
cally became members of the WTO, provided they assumed all
obligations stipulated under the WTO agreement.
57
a. Functions of the WTO
The WTO serves as the legal and institutional base to foster
a global trading network.5" The WTO has five major functions.59
Article XI I (1) states that "In]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI,
any contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and its bal-
ance of payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be
imported, subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article." See
GATT art. XVIII(b) (using quotas to counteract balance of payment problems). Article
XIX(1) (a) states:
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obli-
gations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, includ-
ing tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory
of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers
in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting
party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and
for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the
concession.
Id.
54. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 87.
55. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
56. Chen, supra note 9 (explaining that WTO Agreement incorporated series of
agreements served to remedy problems that arose under GATT).
57. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND: AN OVERVIEW, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, 77th Session, Nov. 21 and
25, (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/ldc2_512.htm [hereinafter COM-
MrTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT]. Members must assume the obligations pursuant
to several agreements in the area of goods, services, and intellectual property. Id.
Members must also submit concession schedules addressing goods and services. Id.
This ideology is known as single undertaking approach to the Uruguay Round resolu-
tions, meaning that membership to the WTO is contingent upon accepting all the reso-
lutions to the 1994 Uruguay Round negotiations without exception. Id.
58. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 13 (1999). See WTO Agree-
ment art. IV( 1) (stating that WTO functions are carried out by Ministerial Conference).
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First, it facilitates the implementation, administration, and oper-
ation of WTO objectives, as well as those objectives under the
Multilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
60
Second, the WTO provides a forum for negotiations. 6'
Such a forum allows Member States to address matters involving
multilateral trade relations.6 2 The WTO creates a forum to facil-
itate negotiations and develops a framework to implement reso-
lutions arising from these negotiations.6
Third, the WTO resolves claims under its dispute resolution
system.64 In order to resolve a dispute, the WTO applies the
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("DSU"). 65 The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") uses the DSU
WTO Agreement art. IV(l) (stating that Ministerial Conference is comprised of Mem-
ber State representatives, who have authority to make decisions with regards to matters
covered by Multilateral Trade Agreements at request of Member States). This function
is carried out according to the stipulations within this Agreement and applicable Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements. Id. The WTO's Secretariat is headed by a Director-General.
Id. art. VI(1). The Ministerial Conference appoints the Director-General and estab-
lished the powers, term of office, and obligations under this position. Id. para. 2. The
Director-General appoints the staff and establishes the responsibilities of the Secreta-
riat. Id. para. 3. The scope of the responsibilities of the Director- General and Secreta-
riat shall be solely on an international scale and discharged only by the WTO. Id. para.
4. The WTO also has a General Council comprised of representatives from Member
States. Id. art. 2(2). These members meet as deemed necessary and carry out the func-
tions of the Ministerial Conference in between the Conference's meetings. Id. The
General Council will meet to discharge the responsibilities of both the DSB and the
Trade Policy Review Body. Id. paras. 3-4.
59. See generally WTO Agreement art. III.
60. WTO Agreement art. 11(1). Under Article II of the WTO Agreement, the Mul-
tilateral Trade Agreements are integral parts of the WTO Agreement and, thus, binding
upon all Member States. Id. art. II. Also under Article 1I, the Plurilateral Trade Agree-
ments only bind those Member States who have accepted them and do not levy obliga-
tions or rights upon Members who have not accepted these agreements. Id.
61. WTO Agreement art. 111(2) Article 111(2) states:
[t]he WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its members con-
cerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a
forum for further negotiations among its members concerning their multilat-
eral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of
such negotiations, as may be decided byte Ministerial Conference.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 3.
65. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 3(2), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VO1. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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to address disputes arising under the WTO Agreement.66 The
DSU handles issues arising under individual trade agreements.
67
Fourth, the WTO administers the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism,68 in order to study the trade policies of Member
States.6 9 Finally, the WTO operates the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies in
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund ("IMF").70
Such a coalition is considered extremely important as it im-
proves monitoring over national policies and assures that devel-
oping countries will receive the necessary financial assistance to
adjust to a liberalized multilateral trade system.71
b. Legal System
Scholars consider the DSB a crucial aspect of international,
multilateral trade.7 2 This adjudicatory system is officially known
as the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), which handles disputes
in accordance with the DSU. 71 Under the DSU, WTO members
may assert a claim based on any of the multilateral trade agree-
ments annexed under the WTO Agreement.74 An independent
66. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 58, at 16.
67. See COMMITrEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57 (stating that such
integration reflects single undertaking approach adopted by WTO members).
68. See AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 24, at 24
(explaining that purpose of Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM") is to oversee
trade policies and practices of WTO Members and to evaluate their impact on both
multilateral and plurilateral trading systems). The TPRM is expected to achieve greater
transparency and understanding of Member trade policies, which will lead to better
operation of global trade system. Id.
69. Id.
70. WTO Agreement art. 111(5). Article 111(5) states: "With a view to achieving
greater coherence in global economic policy- making, the WTO shall cooperate, as ap-
propriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies." Id.
71. See COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57 (noting that coali-
tion also dismissed idea of inconsistency between trade policy recommendations, with
regards to developing country lending policies and requirements under what is now
WTO).
72. See DSU art. 3(2) (stating that General Provisions state that DSB is central ele-
ment in providing immunity and stability to multilateral trading system).
73. DSU art. 2(1). The DSB works under the authority of the General Council.
WTO Agreement art. IV(3). The DSB has its own chairman and procedural rules nec-
essary to accomplish its responsibilities, which are provided for in the DSU. Id.
74. DSU art. 1(1). Article 1(1) states:
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes
brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the
agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this
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panel, which is comprised of experts in international trade and
in the consistency of trade measures under GATT, hear these
actions.75
At the 1994 Uruguay Round, the DSU modified the GATT
adjudicatory system.7 6 Under the WTO adjudicatory system,
Member States may not unilaterally determine violations or sus-
pend concessions.77 Instead, they must adhere to the rules and
regulations of the DSU in order to accomplish such a goal.78
Member States, furthermore, do not need a consensus for proce-
dures leading up to the adoption of panel rulings. 79 Rather, the
Understanding as the "covered agreements"). The rules and procedures of
this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of dis-
putes between Members concerning their rights and obligations under the
provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (re-
ferred to in this Understanding as the "WTO Agreement") and of this Under-
standing taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agree-
ment.
Id.
75. Id. art. 8(1). Article 8(1) states:
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-govern-
mental individuals, including persons.who have served on or presented a case
to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to
GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or pub-
lished on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy
official of a Member.
Id.
76. See ANATOMY OF WTO, supra note 24, at 59.
77. See DSU art. 23(2) (a). Article 23(2) (a) states:
[Member States shall] not make a determination to the effect that a violation
has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attain-
ment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and pro-
cedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consis-
tent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report
adopted by.the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understand-
ing ....
Id.
78. Id. Along the lines of limiting unilateral action, under DSU Article 23, a Mem-
ber cannot make its own determination that a violation or non-violation has occurred.
Id. The Member State must rely on the dispute settlement process, unless its own find-
ings are consistent with what is determined under a panel or appellate body report. Id.
79. See Zsolt K Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?: A Look at the Banana
Trade War and the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 265 (1996) (noting that prior to DSU panel report
had to be adopted by consensus, therefore any contracting party could block adoption
of report). DSU asserts that panel report is considered adopted unless either a dispu-
tant appeals report's findings or DSB decides, by consensus, not to adopt report. Id.
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WTO uses a negative consensus, which mandates a consensus
only to stop proceedings from advancing during any stage of the
formal dispute resolution process.80
The establishment of an independent panel and the adop-
tion of a panel report is now virtually automatic.8 " An Appellate
Body (the "AB") affords an independent panel to disputing par-
ties before a panel report becomes legally binding.8 2 The newly
formed AB is comprised of seven members, three of whom serve
on a given case.8 3 The AB only reviews issues of law covered
within the panel report, as well as the Panel's legal interpreta-
tions.8 4
Once a panel or AB report is issued, the relevant party must
notify the Panel or AB of its intentions to adopt the recom-
mended implementations.8 5 If a party cannot immediately com-
ply with a panel report, the DSU will give that party a reasonable
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Bessko, supra note 79 (explaining that shorter, more exact time limits for
each procedural stage have been established). Under the DSU, a Member who wishes
to assert a claim must actually enter into consultations within 30 days from its request to
enter into said consultations within another Member country. DSU art. 4(3). If a set-
tlement has not been achieved after sixty days from this initial request, the complaining
party may seek the assembly of a panel. Id. para. 7. A panel generally completes its
work within 6 months (or 3 months in a case of exigency). Id. art. 12. Panel reports
may be considered by the DSB 20 days after are issued to Members. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
Within 60 days after issuance, the panel report will be adopted, unless the DSB decides,
by consensus, not to adopt the report or unless one of the disputing parties notifies the
DSB that it will appeal. Id. para. 4. Shorter time limits allow an alternative means to
unilateral action and also speed up the dispute settlement process. Bessko, supra note
79.
83. DSU art. 17(1). Article 17(1) states:
[a] standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate
Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven per-
sons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appel-
late Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the
working procedures of the Appellate Body.
Id.
84. Id. art. 17(6). These proceedings last no longer than sixty days from the date
that a party serves notice that it will appeal. Id. art. 17(5). The DSB issues a report that
must be accepted, without condition, by the disputants within 30 days of that report's
issuance to the relevant parties and Members States, unless otherwise rejected by a DSB
consensus. Id. art. 17(4).
85. Id. art. 21(3). Article 21(3) states:
At a DSB meeting held within 30 days 11 after the date of adoption of the
panel or Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB
of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the rec-
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amount of time to comply.8 6 This reasonable amount of time
will be memorialized by an agreement between the parties and
subject to subsequent DSB approval within forty-five days of the
panel report's adoption or via arbitration within ninety days
from a report's adoption. 7
c. Treatment of Developing and Least-Developed Countries
The WTO promotes the continued growth, in the area of
international trade, of its developing and least-developed Mem-
ber States.88 Least-developed countries receive special consider-
ations with regards to market access.89 Such special considera-
tions include provisions that allow longer transition periods for
implementing certain trade obligations and complete exemp-
tion from obligations normally required of Member States.9 ° In
furtherance of these least-developed countries fulfilling their ob-
ligations, while simultaneously reaping the benefits of the multi-
lateral trade system, the WTO agreed that all measures created
to assist these countries will be guaranteed via regular reviews. 9
The original GATT agreement also gave these Member
States a similar special consideration with regard to market ac-
cess.9 2 Therefore, some of the provisions provided under the
ommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable
period of time in which to do so.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 21(3) (b). Article 21(3) (b) states that a reasonable time period is that
which is "mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the date of
adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement
.
Id.
88. See WTO Agreement (stating that parties to agreement "[r]ecogniz[e] ... that
there is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in interna-
tional trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development").
89. VAN HOuTrE, supra note 4, at 39. Economists have generated criteria to deter-
mine whether a country is developed or developing. Id. Developing countries are fur-
ther divided into: the least-developed countries, less developed countries and new in-
dustrialized countries. Id. In the area of international trade law, a country that wants
to be recognized as a developing country can present itself as such for approval by
richer nations. Id.
90. GATT art. XI.
91. See Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-Developed Countries, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 1248 (1994).
92. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57.
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WTO build upon what is provided under GATT.93 The WTO
Committee on Trade and Development provides technical assis-
tance that allows these countries to develop, strengthen, and di-
versify their production and export markets.94 These countries,
therefore, may maximize their newly found, liberalized access to
the trade market.
95
The WTO expressed the need for the allocation of financial
and non-financial resources to developing countries.9 This allo-
cation of resources would assist developing countries in the re-
lief of their monetary debts and the insurance of their economic
development.97 The WTO also acknowledged the specific needs
of these countries and agreed to continue the use of positive
measures, in favor of these countries, in order to expand their
trading opportunities.9"
The WATO predicted improved market access in the area of
agriculture. 99 A reduction of trade barriers, domestic support
measures, subsidies used to promote export competition, as well
as an increase in the role of bindings enabled these improve-
ments.""° These improvements also required Member States to
convert all non-tariff measures to tariffs, as well as bind 100% of
agricultural tariff lines.1"'
93. See COMMI-FrEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57 (explaining that in
addition to retaining provisions from original GATT 1947, new agreements under WTO
will have provisions for developing and least-developed countries that will require
longer transition periods to fully implement obligations).
94. Id. (explaining that technical assistance allows developing countries to reap
benefits of multilateral trading system).
95. Id.
96. See COMMirTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57 (explaining that
WTO acknowledges need for financial and real investment resources for developing
nations as well as more efforts to assist developing countries to relieve their debt).
97. Id.
98. See Decisions on Measures in Favor of Least-Developed Countries, supra note
91, para. 3. (stating that Member States "[a]gree to keep under review the specific
needs of the least-developed countries and to continue to seek the adoption of positive
measures which facilitate the expansion of trading opportunities in favour of these
countries").
99. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57.
100. See id. (stating that bindings, with respect to tariffs on certain products at
particular level, occur when country agrees not to increase tariffs above that level; bind-
ings have played crucial part in establishing domestic and international credibility for
domestic reform programs); see also Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
101. See COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 57 (noting that
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B. The Banana Regime
During the twentieth century, the two World Wars brought
economic ruin to, and shifted world power away from, Eu-
rope. 10 2 Since the wars ended European imperialism, Europe
sought to create a new world order in an effort to rebuild itself
as a collective world power.'0 3 In furtherance of this goal, the
European countries realized that they stood to gain a tremen-
dous economic advantage if they included their colonies and for-
mer colonies in their post-World War II revitalization plans. 104
1. Background
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome1 "5 established the European
Economic Treaty among several European countries. 106 The Eu-
ropean Economic Treaty granted several African colonies special
status that allowed them economic and technical assistance, in-
cluding tariff preferences for their exports to the EEC market.
0 7
In return, the African colonies gave reciprocal preferential treat-
ment to imports from European Economic Community ("EEC")
members.1 08
During the 1960s, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 109 developed a system under which the more
developed countries would lower the customs duties levied on
imports from developing countries.110 As a result, the producers
in developing countries would have a better opportunity to com-
under new tariff measures, security of trade products will be greater than industrial
products for first time in GATT's history).
102. See Bessko, supra note 79 (explaining that twentieth century ended European
imperialism by way of anti-colonialism struggles and World Wars I and II).
103. See id. (noting that after World War II, new era of North-South relations com-
menced and by 1960s Europe released many of their colonies).
104. Id.
105. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
106. Id. The European countries involved were France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany. Id.
107. EEC Treaty arts. 131-36 and annex IV; Bessko, supra note 79.
108. See Bessko, supra note 79 n.26 (citing to Conventions of Association between
EEC and African and Malagasy States Associated with that Community.)
109. See VAN HOUTrE, supra note 4, at 102 (stating that United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") is comprised of 190 member countries).
UNCTAD was created to promote economic growth in the developing countries
through international trade, to create principles and policy for international trade and
economic development as well as to make proposals in furtherance of these goals. Id.
110. Id. at 105.
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pete with domestic producers in importing countries."1 ' This
laid the foundation for a GSP. 112
In 1971, GATT contracting parties executed a GSP. t13 A
GSP aims to help developing countries increase their export
earnings, increase their economic growth, and promote their in-
dustrialization. 14 Under a GSP, individualized regimes with de-
veloping countries promote the export growth of these countries
while, simultaneously, allows developed countries to determine
the precise nature of the concessions they would allow." 5
Meanwhile, in 1973, the Treaty of Accession'16 drew Den-
mark and the United Kingdom into the EEC.1 7 Subsequently,
Great Britain lobbied to bring its former colonies, which in-
cluded several African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations, under
EEC status.'" Great Britain's lobbying efforts, and the overall
desire for a new international economic regime, which would
allow the EEC to engage in a partnership with their former colo-
nies, resulted in the birth of Lom6." 9
Il1. Id. The EU and 18 former French and Belgian colonies in Africa echoed the
principle of preferential treatment during the Yaoundd Convention. BERMAN supra
note 32, at 948. At the conclusion of the second Yaounde Convention in 1969, the EU
had entered into the Arusha Agreement with Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. BERMAN,
supra note 32, at 948. Similar to its predecessors, this agreement dealt with providing
financial and technical assistance to these countries. Id.
112. VAN Hou-rE, supra note 4, at 106.
113. See generally GSP. SeeJAcKSoN, supra note 38, at 1126 (discussing that under
GATT GSP waived Article I for period of 10 years). See also VAN HOUarE, supra note 4,
at 106 (explaining that even though GSP originated from UNCTAD, its regulation lies
with GATT).
114. JACKSON, supra note 38, at 1128. See VAN HouTrE, supra note 4, at 106 (argu-
ing that based on studies of application of GSP between 1971 and 1980, it appears
system favored newly industrialized countries).
115. Id.
116. See Documents Concerning the Accession to the European Communities of
the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Decision of the Council of European Communi-
ties of 22 January 1972 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to
the European Atomic Energy Community, 1972 O.J. L73 [hereinafter Treaty of Acces-
sion].
117. Id.
118. See Bessko, supra note 79 (stating that Britain lobbied to include its former
colonies, known as Commonwealth of Nations, as part of EEC under associate status).
119. See Bessko, supra note 79 (stating that pressure from Great Britain resulted in
replacement of Yaound6 Conventions with Lom6, which changed relationship between
EEC and former colonies from association to partnership).
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2. Regulations
Lomb served as a way for the EU to aid in the economic
development of its former Third World colonies. 120 Lom6 pro-
moted the concept of sustainable development based on the re-
sources available to these countries, their respective social values,
and their economic potential. 12 ' Lom6 provided the framework
for Regulation EEC No. 404/93, which similarly granted prefer-
ential treatment to developing African, Caribbean and Pacific
("ACP") nations under a slightly more complicated system. 122
a. The Lom6 Conventions
Lom6, which allocated duty-free and quota-free prefer-
ences, was the largest non-GSP program. 123 Under Lom6, the
EU granted a wide range of preferences and financial assistance
to ACP nations. 24 Under a GSP scheme, industrialized nations
grant a narrower set of preferences to certain products from de-
veloping nations. 121
i. Lom6 Conventions One Through Three
In 1975, the EEC, its Member States, and forty-six ACP
countries signed the first Lom6 Convention 12
6 ("Lom6 I).127
120. See id. (commenting that EU viewed Lome as means to test their desire for
regional economic integration and developing countries view Lom6 as breakthrough in
their quest to develop economically, politically, and socially with rest of industrialized
world).
121. Id. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 95 (noting that ACP countries argue that
alternative exports are not feasible because these crops must face disadvantages of ter-
rain, climate, and size of plantations). The ACPs argue that in order generate profits,
any substitute product would require access to major markets, the majority of which are
already ingrained in competition. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 95. Other exports must
depend on regular shipping service, which can only be insured by the volume of ba-
nana sales. Id.
122. Bustamante, supra note 2, at 533.
123. JACKSON, supra note 38, at 1130-31. See MAURITIUS FREEPORT DEVELOPMENT:
LOME, at http://mfd.intnet.mu/cross/lome.htm [hereinafter MAURITIUS] (stating that
Lom6 allows products into EU, duty free, as long as certificate of circulation, known as
"EUR 1" is obtained). EUR 1 is similar to certificate of origin and is secured only where
product being exported was entirely produced in an ACP nation. MAURITIUS, supra
note 123.
124. JACKSON, supra note 38, at 1131.
125. Id.
126. Lom6 I.
127. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 84. The Member States of EU that were present
include: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 84, n.1
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Lom6 I created a cooperative atmosphere between the EEC, its
Member States, and the ACP nations, which would serve as a cat-
alyst for the social, economic, and cultural development of the
ACP nations. 12 Pursuant to this goal, Lom6 I supported sustain-
able development based on the ACP nation's social and cultural
values, human capital, natural resources, and the potential for
economic growth. 12
9
Similar to pre-Lom6 treaties, Lom6 I provided financial and
trade preferences to ACP nations. 3 ° Financial aid, which was
renewable every five years, included money from the EU Mem-
ber States that was placed in a fund called the European Devel-
opment Fund, as well as financing by the European Investment
Bank in the form of low interest loans.'31 The trade preferences
included stability preferences for extended periods of time and
mutually agreed upon contractuality preferences, which may not
be modified unilaterally. 132
Lom6 I established another preference: non-reciprocity
under which ACP countries are exempted from extending recip-
rocal trade preferences to EU exports.' 33 The Stabex system
provided stable prices on the banana and sugar exports to the
EU.'3 4 Lom6 I also insured that ACP nations had duty-free ac-
cess to the EU market on almost 100% of all its products.'35
Lom6 signatories renewed and renegotiated the convention
three additional times.'3 6 They signed Lom6 II in 1979 and
128. See id. at 84 (noting that Lom6's original purpose calls for partnership-like
relationship). Lom6 exists to promote and expedite the economic, cultural, and social
development of the ACP states, as well as consolidate and diversify the relationship
between the European Community and the ACP nations. Id.
129. Id.
130. BERMANN, supra note 32, at 948.
131. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 84 (commenting that terms of this direct financ-
ing agreement must be renewed every five years).
132. Id.
133. BERMANN, supra note 32, at 949.
134. Id. The Stabex system was in response to the fact that ACP export earnings of
have traditionally depended on agricultural commodities, which are foodstuffs and
other raw materials; ACP export earnings have been subject to significant fluctuations
because the prices of those commodities are often subject to large oscillations in world
markets. Id. See generally VAN Hou-r-rE, supra note 4, at 109 (setting out conditions to be
met in order to apply this stabilization mechanism).
135. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 84; BERMANN supra note 32, at 949.
136. See Bessko, supra note 79 (commenting that foundation and principal charac-
teristics of subsequent conventions remain close to Lom6 I).
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Lom6 III in 1984, each having a five year term. 13 7
ii. Fourth Lome Convention
Lom6 IV, the most recent Lom6 agreement, expired Febru-
ary 29, 2000.138 Although Lom6 IV encompassed provisions sim-
ilar to the previous Lom6 Conventions, it modified the Stabex
system a3 9 and extended the range of recipients who would re-
ceive financial and technical assistance. 4 ° Lom6 IV allocated
more funding than Lom6 III.1 4 1 In addition, Lom6 IV estab-
lished a number of committees to further the cooperative efforts
between the EU and the ACP nations. 14 2
Lome IV established Protocol Five, which pertained exclu-
sively to the banana trade. 43 Protocol Five guaranteed that any
ACP nation that supplies bananas to the EU will not be placed in
a less favorable position than they would have enjoyed upon the
actualization of a single EU market.144 In addition, Protocol Five
allowed the EU to establish general regulations for the banana
trade: under the conditions that the EU fully consult with the
137. Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Oct. 31, 1979, OJ. [L 347/2 (1980)],
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980) [hereinafter Lom6 II]; Third ACP-EEC Convention of
Lom6, Dec. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 571 (1985) [hereinafter Lom6 III]. Lomo ran from 1980
through 1985 and was signed by 65 states; Lom6 II ran from 1985 through 1990 and was
signed by 69 states. Sheppard, supra note 14 at n.12.
138. African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Final
Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783
(1990) [hereinafter Lom6 IV].
139. See MAURITIUS, supra note 123 (stating that Stabex system was designed to
stabilize prices for some agricultural products exported by ACP countries).
140. BERMANN, supra note 32 at 949-50. Unlike its predecessors, Lom IV, signed
on December 15, 1989, lasted for a 10-year period; the financial protocol, which was
contingent upon the 7th European Development Fund, was signed for five-year period.
MAURITIUS, supra note 123.
141. See id. (explaining that Lom6 IV allotted approximately ECU3,500,000,000 to
alleviate foreign debt problems faced by many ACP countries, and make them more
competitive force in banana trade).
142. Id.
143. Lom6 IV, protocol 5. Protocol 5 states:
The Community and the ACP States agree to the objectives of improving the
conditions under which the ACP States' bananas are produced and marketed
and of continuing the advantages enjoyed by traditional suppliers in accor-
dance with the undertakings of Article I of this Protocol and agree that appro-
priate measures shall be taken for their implementation.
Id.
144. Id. Protocol 5, art. 1 stipulates: "[N]o ACP State shall be placed, as regards
access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favorable
situation than in the past or at present." Id.
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ACP countries to formulate these regulations, and that no tradi-
tional ACP supplier is placed in a less favorable position in lieu
of these regulations. 45  This Protocol supplements Article
168(1) of Lom6 IV, which stipulates that banana imports to the
EU from ACP countries are duty free.' 46
iii. Overall Critiques of Lom6
The European Commission, presented a recent analysis
concerning Lom6 IV's impact.147 According to this report, in
1997, the twelve ACP states used only 75% of their allocation,
under Protocol Five, and generated about ECU400,000,000.14
8
From 1988-97, total ACP exports grew by just under 4% in vol-
ume as compared to other developing countries that grew by
75%. 149 Only five of these ACP countries grew at a rate greater
than other developing countries as a result of a margin of prefer-
ence. 150 The ACPs under Lom6, as compared to the GSP re-
gime, enjoy a preferential margin of 2%. t5 '
145. Id. Protocol 5, art. 2. Article 2 states:
Each of the ACP States concerned and the Community shall confer in order to
determine the measures to be implemented so as to improve the conditions
for the production and marketing of bananas. This aim shall be pursued
through all the means available under the arrangements of the Convention
for financial, technical, agricultural, industrial and regional cooperation. The
measures in question shall be designed to enable the ACP States, particularly
Somalia, amount being taken of their individual circumstances, to become
more competitive both on their traditional markets and on the markets of the
Community. Measures will be implemented at all stages from production to
consumption ....
Id.
146. Id. art. 168(1). Article 168(1) states that "[p]roducts originating in the ACP
States shall be imported into the Community free of customs duties and charges having
equivalent effect."
147. REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN THE LOMt
IV TRADE REGIME AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF RETAINING IT, CE/TFN/GCEC3/09-EN,
ACP/61/002/99 (1999), available at http://www.acpsec.org/gb/trade/pref/prefane.
html.
148. See id. (noting that 640,409 tons of ACP bananas were exported).
149. Id.
150. See id. (identifying five countries as Mauritius, Jamaica, Madagascar, Kenya,
and Zimbabwe; Lom6 preference is defines as products having preferential margin
higher than 3%, excluding commodity protocol products).
151. See id. (explaining that protocols maintain traditional trade for benefiting
countries, therefore advantage derived by Lom6 protocol can only be measured by
amount of imports and not by preferential margin compared to MFN or GSP tariffs,
which according to Commission would prevent imports into EC). Commission states
that compared with the GSP in 1996 the preferential margin was ECU504,000,000
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Opponents of Lombe strongly believe that such preferential
treatment encourages a welfare-like state of dependency on the
EU for access to the common market and financial aid. 15 2 Op-
ponents believe that where ACP nations are forced into the free
market economy and compete with developed nations, interna-
tional development should be defined.' Critics attribute the
historical division of labor between the ACPs and the EU as a
another reason for Lom6's failure; more specifically that the pro-
duction of primary commodities are given to developing nations,
while the production of industrialized commodities are assigned
to Europe. 154 Opponents also believe there is a waning interest
by EU partners to assist the ACP nations.' 55
iv. Overall Advantages of Lom6
Proponents of Lom6 argue that countries must be given
some time to develop their economies in order to function, on
an equal footing, with developed nations in the long run. 156
Lom, supporters argue that Lom6 has converted the ACP-EU
relationship from one of exploitative colonialism to a willingness
by the EU to provide assistance to ACP nations in consideration
of their specific needs. 157 Several political reasons have been as-
(2.5%) and the MFN preferential margin, based on the 1996 EU tariff, was
ECU734,000,000. Id.
152. See Sheppard, supra note 14 at 89 (stating that critics argue Lom6 prolongs
problems of ACP countries by creating dependence on EU, which promotes paternalis-
tic and agent/principle relationships instead of partnership as was originally intended
under Lomb).
153. See id. at 89 (stating commentators believe that international development
theory has reached impasse and lacks direction).
154. See Douglas E. Matthews, Lom IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost
Decade, 22 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 1, 5 (1991) (stating that historic division of labor allocates
production of primary commodities to African nations, while production of industrial
goods are designated to Europe).
155. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 88-90 (explaining decline in interest has been
attributed to several factors which include: EC's goals of achieving new international
economic order and recruiting newly democratized Eastern European and Mediterra-
nean nations; disappointing decrease in ACPs' share of EU banana market; failure to
diversify export products; end of Cold War; formation of single EU market; rigidity of
ACPs' somewhat diverse socio-political and economic structures; and decrease in finan-
cial aid which has rerouted itself back to EU's sovereign interests and concerns).
156. See Chen, supra note 9, at 1303 (explaining that developing countries will
continue to lag behind in economic development unless they are given time to invigor-
ate their economies).
157. See Matthews, supra note 154, at 5 (arguing that examples in support of this
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serted in support of Lom6 as well. 
1 5
b. EEC Regulation No. 404/93
Before 1993, the EU still had not achieved its goal of a sin-
gle market. 159  Twelve regimes existed before 1993.160 These
regulations placed quantitative restrictions against non-ACP
countries that also exported bananas to the EU. 16 1 Many coun-
tries called for a single and uniform trade policy to regulate ba-
nana imports. 162 After much negotiation, the EEC adopted Reg-
ulation 404/93 in February of 1993.16
Regulation 404/93 established four categories of banana
imports: traditional ACP country imports, non-traditional ACP
country imports, third country imports, and EU bananas. 64
evolution include emphasis on self-reliance in Southern Hemisphere and highly con-
cessional terms with regard to aid).
158. See Chen, supra note 9, at 1305 (explaining that if Latin and U.S. GATT signa-
tories had refused to approve Lomei, repercussions would be initiated by EU and other
contracting Parties).
159. See Bessko, supra note 79 (stating that EU needed to agree on uniform ba-
nana regime that factored Lom6 obligations, EU's domestic banana production, Latin
American banana production, and securing reasonable prices for EU consumers).
160. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 86 (explaining regimes could be classified into
four categories of regimes that ranged from complete ban on banana imports to regime
with no restrictive tariffs); see Bessko, supra note 79, n.48 (stating that pursuant to Proto-
col Five, Britain, France, and Italy had protected banana imports under Regulation
288/82 and Article 115 of EC Treaty). Council Regulation 288/82 uses quantitative
restrictions to protect banana production within France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Bessko, supra note 79, n.43. EEC Treaty Article 115, which is normally invoked if na-
tional products are harmed by indirect imports, extends to the protection of ACP ba-
nanas. Id. at n.48.
161. Bessko, supra note 79, at n.43.
162. Bessko, supra note 79.
163. Regulation 404/93 became effective on July 1, 1993. Council Regulation No.
404/93, O.J. L 47/1 (1993) [hereinafter EEC 404/931. EEC 404/93 stipulates that its
purpose is "to ensure a satisfactory marketing of bananas produced within the [EC] and
of products originating in the ACP states within the framework of the Lom6 Conven-
tion Agreements." Id., at para. 16. Under Regulation 404/93, uniform rules were es-
tablished in the areas of: common quality and marketing standards, assistance, banana
producer's organizations and concentration devices, and more specifically the trade of
bananas with third countries. Lyons, supra note 31 at 178.
164. Lyons, supra note 31, at 178. See Bustamante, supra note 2, at 540 (noting that
in case at bar, traditional imports from ACP nations are defined as amount of bananas
originating in ACP states that had traditionally exported bananas into EC). Non-tradi-
tional imports are bananas from ACP states not traditionally exported to the EU and
those from traditional ACP suppliers that exceeded the allotted duty free ton alloca-
tion. Bustamante, supra note 2, at 540. Imports from third countries are defined as
those bananas produced in non-ACP, Latin American nations. Id.
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Regulation 404/93 allowed ACP countries to import bananas to
Europe, duty free, whereas non-ACP bananas were subject to a
tariff quota.'6 5 Regulation 404/93 also established a licensing
system to appease third country and non-traditional, ACP ba-
nana importers. 16
6
II. THE BANANA DISPUTE
At one end of the banana dispute are the ACP countries
that trade with the EU.167 At the other end of the dispute are
several Latin American countries, which also produce and ex-
port bananas to the EU.' 68 Similar to many of the ACP coun-
165. Bessko, supra note 79. ACP countries are allowed to import up to a maximum
of 857,700 tons of bananas into the common market duty free. EEC 404/93 arts. 15, 18.
Non-traditional ACP countries and third countries may import up to 2,000,000 tons
into the common market at a 100ECU/ton tariff. Id. art. 15. Imports over the
2,000,000 ton quota are subject to a 750ECU/ton tariff for ACP country imports and an
850 per ton tariff for third country imports. Id. art. 18.
166. Bessko, supra note 79. Regulation 404/93 also allocated banana import li-
censes for the benefit of importers from non-traditional ACP countries and third coun-
try importers is as follows: 65.5% of the licenses were given to importers who market
third country or non-traditional bananas; 30% of the licenses were given to operators
who market EU and/or traditional ACP bananas and 3.5% were given to importers
established with the EU and marketing bananas other than EU or traditional ACP ba-
nanas starting in 1992. EEC 404/93 art. 19(1). The amount each importer under the
first two categories is allotted is based upon "the average quantity each has sold in the
three most recent years for which figures are available." Id. art. 19(2). See Azar M.
Khansari, Searching For The Perfect Solution: International Dispute Resolution and the New
World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 183, 199 (1996) (noting
that Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Mex-
ico, and El Salvador were most adversely affected by Regulation 404/93).
167. Lyons, supra note 31 at 171. See Europa Development-ACP Countries, available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/country/index-en.htm (listing 71 ACP
countries that participated under Lom6 V: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Fiji,
Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshal Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togolese Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe). At the other end of the dispute are several Latin American countries
and the United States, which will be discussed in further detail in subsection 1. Lyons,
supra note 31, at 171.
168. See Lyons, supra note 31, at 172 (noting that these countries include Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
768 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:744
tries, agriculture, particularly bananas, is the principal export of
these Latin American countries.
169
1. Opponents
With financial support from the United States, it is cheaper
for Latin American countries to produce their bananas than it is
for the ACP nations.' The Latin American nations asserted
that the preservation of preferential treatment towards the ACP
exports would be detrimental to their respective economies.
171
The ACP nations argued that the elimination of a preferential
export system would prove detrimental to their respective econo-
mies. 172
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela). Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador,
and Cuba did not belong to GATT. Id. at n.67.
169. See Lyons, supra note 31 at 173 (explaining that this is due to falling prices of
other major Latin American exports, such as sugar and coffee, on international mar-
ket).
170. Id.
171. See id. (arguing that production cost advantages they possess is worthless if
banana regime exists, thus depriving Latin American countries of full value of their
production capabilities). Latin American countries warn that hundreds of thousands of
jobs will be lost and economic health will be in jeopardy if the current banana regime is
not modified. Id.
172. See Khansari, supra note 166, at 198 (arguing that competition from Latin
American countries may prevent ACP countries from having central role in market).
See CLAIRE GODFREY, POLICY DEPARTMENT, OXFAM UK AND IRELAND, A FUTURE FOR CAR-
IBBEAN BANANAS-THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE'S BANANAS MARKET TO THE CARIBBEAN
(March 1998), at http://www.oneworld.org/textve/oxfam/policy/papers/ba-
nanas.htm (noting that OXFAM is proponent for banana regime and Lom6 argue that
their share of European banana market will be compromised with elimination of pref-
erential treatment; thousands of people will be condemned to poverty and even pose
serious threat to Caribbean Winward islands' future political and economic stability).
OXFAM argues that Eastern Caribbean would suffer the most in the Caribbean region
because of shared currency and in general Caribbean Community because of intra-
regional trading. Some farmers may abandon their farms and turn to the illegal drug
trade to make ends meet or emigration. Godfrey, supra; see also Sheppard, supra note
14, at 94 (commenting that other adverse consequences as result of Lom4's elimination
include: unemployment, political unrest, adversity in tourism industry, and illegal im-
migration); Dr. Stephen J. H. Dearden, The EU Banana Regime and the Caribbean Island
Economies, DSA European Development Policy Study Group, Discussion Paper No. 1 (Dec.
1996), available at http://www.euforic.org/dsa/dpl.htm (noting potato production has
been encouraged as substitute for banana imports in Dominica; in St. Lucia locally
grown fresh vegetables, which would be supplied to tourist industry would serve as ba-
nana substitute). In order to replace bananas as dominant export crop, Dominica and
St. Lucia have promoted production of mangos, grapefruits, avocados, and oranges, but
these attempts have been met with limited success because bananas, with their labor-
intensive capital-saving production and quick returns, are a better crop. Dearden,
supra.
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a. Latin America
Unlike the ACP countries, Latin American countries have
significantly cheaper production costs.173 This is mostly attrib-
uted to the fact that several large multinational corporations, in-
cluding the Dole Food Company, Inc. ("Dole") and Chiquita
Brands International, Inc. ("Chiquita"), have made large capital
investments in Latin America's banana industry.174 As a result,
many Latin American banana plantations are much larger than
the ACP plantations, which are generally owned by independent
farmers and therefore, the Latin American plantations are more
economically efficient in their production."' The Latin Ameri-
can countries are labeled as dollar zone banana producing coun-
tries because of their extremely cheap production costs.' 76
b. The United States
The United States initiated the banana dispute when it filed
a petition under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 with
the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"). 7 7 Section
173. Khansari, supra note 166, at 198.
174. Id.
175. See id. (noting that ACP bananas are twice as expensive as Latin American
bananas).
176. See id. (noting that apparently, dollar zone bananas are quarter of cost that it
is for Caribbean to produce bananas; in addition, labor and transportation costs are less
expensive in Latin American producing countries versus their Caribbean counterparts).
These Latin American countries export to several European countries, such as Ger-
many, which has the highest consumption of bananas in Europe as well as a preference
for Latin American bananas, because they are cheaper to grow and apparently tastier.
Id. Because of their U.S. backing, the Lati.n American countries are able to ship their
bananas fully ripe, whereas the Caribbean producers ship bananas green and under-
sized. Id.
177. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-09, amended 6y, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
Section 2411(a) discusses mandatory action, which states:
If the United States Trade Representative determines under section 304(a) (1)
[19 USCS § 2414(a)(1)] that:
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being de-
nied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies
benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is
unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce; the
Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection (c),
subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any
such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible action
within the power of the President that the President may direct the
Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such
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301 is the U.S. complement to GATT's, and now the WTO's, dis-
pute settlement system. 178 Section 301 allows private parties to
assert their U.S. rights under various international trade agree-
ments and to file suit against trade practices that they believe are
unfair.
179
On September 2, 1994, Chiquita and the Hawaii Banana In-
dustry Association joined the banana dispute and filed a petition
with the USTR.180 They claimed that the present trade regimes
under Regulation 404/93 and the Banana Framework Agree-
ment 181 ("BFA"), which the EU, Colombia, Costa Rica, Vene-
zuela, and Nicaragua adopted, discriminated against U.S. mar-
keters importing Latin American produced bananas.18 2  The
USTR subsequently launched an investigation in October, 1994
rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
Actions may be taken that are within the power of the President with
respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect to any other
area of pertinent relations with the foreign country.
Id.
178. See Bessko, supra note 79 (stating that statute is domestic counterpart to
GATT (now WTO) dispute settlement system).
179. See id. (noting that petition under section 301 may be filed by either private
party or by USTR itself). With regards to a violative measure or practice, the USTR acts
when there is an inconsistency or denial of U.S. rights under any trade agreement or
when there is an inexcusable burden on U.S. commerce. See Trade Act of 1974
§ 301 (a). With regards to a non-violation measure, the USTR may take action against
measures that it believes are discriminatory and burden U.S. commerce. Id. § 301(b).
The USTR, however, cannot take action if a panel determines that no violation of U.S.
rights occurred or is attempting to rectify the issue. Id. The USTR must suspend, with-
draw, or prevent the application of concessions, impose duties and/or restrictions, and
enter into an agreement that will serve to rectify the situation. Id.
180. Bustamante, supra note 2, at 545.
181. Costa Rica-Colombia-Dominican Republic-European Community-Nicaragua-
Venezuela: Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, March 29, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1
(1995) [hereinafter BFA]. This agreement was created by the EU and adopted by all
complaining parties to the case at bar (except for Guatemala), in a quid pro quo to get
country-specific shares in exchange for the Latin American countries to stop their ef-
forts to get the EU regime to comply with GATT rules. Id. The BFA called for a tariff
quota of 2.1 and 2.2 million tons for the years 1994 and 1995 respectively to be allo-
cated to specific Latin American countries and other ACP countries. Id.
182. See Bessko, supra note 79 (asserting that Regulation 404/93 contained dis-
criminatory and restrictive licensing system that steered market share predominately to
firms trading bananas from ACP nations). Latin American producers claim that the
licensing system restricts its ability to obtain license. Id. This is because available li-
censes to import from Latin America will only be distributed to those who have tradi-
tionally sold bananas produced in ACP nations. Id. They claim that the licensing sys-
tem restricts its ability to obtain license because available license to import from Latin
America will only be distributed to those who have traditionally sold bananas produced
in ACP nations. Id.; see also Bustamante, supra note 2, at 551.
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concerning Regulations 404/93 and the BFA.'8 3 The USTR re-
quested that the contracting parties either re-negotiate or with-
draw from the BFA.18 4 The parties refused. 81
2. Proponents: A Divided European Union
Countries within the EU disagree on how to handle the ba-
nana dispute.86 Opponents to the banana regime include
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.187 Ger-
many"88 leads the EU opposition against the banana regime.
Germany asserts that the 2,000,000 ton quota and tariff regula-
tions implemented by Regulation 404/93 will decrease the
amount of bananas that Germany will be able to import from
Latin America and raise the prices of the bananas in the long
run.18 9 In addition, Germany and other banana regime oppo-
nents believe that these restrictions may be detrimental to Latin
American banana producing countries.19 Opponents argue
that the regime would cause a rise in unemployment and would
compromise the trade relationships that certain EU countries
have with Latin American countries. 19
Proponents for the banana regime believe that these quotas
and tariffs comply with GATT and will protect the ACP countries
from severe economic adversity.19 2 For example, the EEC justi-
fies its regime's alleged inconsistency with the MFN clause of Ar-
ticle I of GATT as being allowed under Article XXIV.' 93 The
EEC argues that it created such a free trade zone with the ACP
countries through the Lom6 Conventions and, therefore, the
183. Bessko, supra note 79.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Lyons, supra note 31, at 174 (noting that current regime was based by very
narrow margin and that many European countries side with Latin American countries
concerning dispute).
187. Id. at 175.
188. See id. at 174 (stating that Germany imported most of its bananas from Latin
America because they were cheaper and were apparently of better quality).
189. Id. at 175.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 175 (stating that proponents include France, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
and the United Kingdom.
193. See id. at 180 (explaining that EU felt justified under GATT Part IV, which
addresses trade disparity between developed and developing nations).
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overall cohesion of Lom6 IV could not be challenged. 194 GATT,
officially, never stipulated that Lom6 IV did not establish a free
trade area, but did hold that there were some inconsistencies
with the MFN clause. 195 Nothing, as a result, prevented the par-
ties of Lom6 IV from achieving their objectives with measures
that are GATT-consistent.
196
B. 1997 Controversy
Under the WTO, dispute settlement procedures became
more stringent in order to make international trade laws more
binding.197 Article 23 of the DSU prohibits unilateral action that
was once allowed under GATT.'98 As a signatory to GATT and a
WITO Member, the Unites States must now seek redress through
the DSB. 99 The United States, along with Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico exercised its option to bring a claim
under the newly established WTO in October, 1995.200
1. WTO's Decision
On February 5, 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mex-
ico, and the United States requested consultations with the EU
in accordance with the DSU.2°1 A Panel convened on May 8,
194. Khansari, supra note 166, at 200.
195. See id. (stating that while Panel recommended that regime should conform
with GATT, Panel never officially held that Lome did not establish free trade area).
196. Id. at nn.185-86.
197. Bessko, supra note 79.
198. See id. (noting that unilateral action brought by United States to levy sanc-
tions is now prohibited).
199. Id.
200. See Bustamante, supra note 2, at 546 (noting that Ecuadorjoined complaint in
February, 1996).
201. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA, (May
22, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Panel Report] (commenting this request was made pursu-
ant to GATT article XXIII and DSU article 4). See GATT art. XXIII. Article 23 states:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representa-
tions as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any mat-
ter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult
with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it
has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation
under paragraph 1.
DSU art. 4. Article 4(1) states that "Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and
improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures employed'by Members."
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1996 to consider the complaint lodged against the EU's banana
regime.202 The regime encompassed Regulation 404/93, and
subsequent, supporting regulations and procedures that were re-
visions of the BFA.203 The complaining parties asserted that the
regime is inconsistent with GATT Articles I, XI and XIII, among
other Agreements under the WTO.2 04
a. Panel Decision
On May 22, 1997, the Panel held that the EU banana re-
gime was inconsistent with its obligations under GATT Articles
1(1), 111(4), X(3), XIII(1) with respect to Ecuador's com-
plaint.2" 5 The Panel held that the regime was inconsistent under
GATT Articles 1(1), 111(4), X(3), and XIII(1) with respect to
both Guatemala and Honduras' complaints. 2°6  Concerning
202. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 1 (Sept. 7, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 AB Report].
203. Id.
204. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Complaint by Ecuador, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997);
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Com-
plaint by Guatemala, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/GTM (May 22, 1997); European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by
Honduras, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/HND (May 22, 1997); European Communi-
ties-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Mexico,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) (noting that all complaining
parties also asserted inconsistencies under Articles 1.2, 1.3, 3.2, and 3.5 of Agreement
on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal_e/final_e.htm [hereinafter Licensing Agreement],
and Articles 2 and 17 of the General Agreements in Trade Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE sULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]).
205. See 1997 AB Report para. 2 (holding that regime was inconsistent under Arti-
cle 1.2 of Licensing Agreement and GATS Articles 2 and 17). Article 1.2 of the Licens-
ing Agreement states:
[m]embers shall ensure that the administrative procedures used to implement
import licensing regimes are in conformity with the relevant provisions of
GATT 1994... with a view to preventing trade distortions that may arise from
an inappropriate operation of those procedures, taking into account the eco-
nomic development purposes and financial and trade needs of developing
county Members.
Licensing Agreement art. 1(2). GATS articles 2 is a most-favored-nation clause similar
to GATT Article I. GATS art 2. GATT article 17 concerns national treatment where
"each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than
it accords to its own like services and services suppliers." Id. art. 17.
206. See 1997 AB Report para. 2 (finding inconsistency under Article 1.3 of Licens-
ing Agreement). Id. Article 1.3 states "[t]he rules for import licensing procedures shall
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Mexico's complaint, the Panel held that the regime was inconsis-
tent with its obligations under GATT Articles I(1), 111(4), X(3),
and XIII(1). 207 Concerning the United States' complaint, the
Panel held that the regime contained inconsistencies under
GATT Articles 1(1), 111(4), X(3) and XIII(1). 208
b. Appellate Body Decision
On June 11, 1997, the EU notified the DSB that it wanted to
appeal certain issues and interpretations of law discussed in the
Panel Report.2°9 On appeal, the AB upheld most of the Panel's
findings. 210 The AB reversed three of the Panel's conclusions
with regards to the regime's consistency under GATT and the
Lom6 Convention.21
The AB upheld the Panel's conclusion that the Agreement
on Agriculture 212 does not allow the EU to deviate from the obli-
gations stipulated under GATT Article XIII. 213 The preamble to
the Agreement on Agriculture stipulates that the Agreement ex-
ists for the purposes of reforming agricultural trade and that
such a reform process will come about in part through effective
GATT rules and provisions. 214 According to the AB, all GATT
be neutral in application and administered in a fair and equitable manner." Licensing
Agreement, art. 1(3).
207. See id. (finding inconsistencies under Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of Licensing Agree-
ment and GATS Articles 2 and 17).
208. Id.
209. 1997 AB Report para. 3.
210. Id.
211. See id. para. 255 (upholding EU's tariff quota licensing system was within
scope of Licensing Agreement). The AB reversed the Panel's prior decision that system
was inconsistent with Article 1.3 of Licensing Agreement. Id. paras. 255(l)-(m). The
AB also upheld the Panel's decision that the regime's licensing was inconsistent under
GATS Articles 2 and 17. Id. paras. 255(s)-(v).
212. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs ,e/legal-e/final-e.htm ).
213. 1997 AB Report para. 158.
214. Agreement on Agriculture. The Preamble states:
[Members] [h]aving decided to establish a basis for initiating a process of re-
form of trade in agriculture in line with the objectives of the negotiations as
set out in the Punta del Este Declaration; [r]ecalling that their long-term ob-
jective as agreed at the Mid-Term Review.of the Uruguay Round 'is to establish
a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform pro-
cess should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support
and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more op-
erationally effective GATT rules and disciplines'.
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provisions, including Article XIII, apply to the case at bar.215 In
addition, the AB reasoned that no provision of the Agreement
on Agriculture expressly stipulates that all market access conces-
sions and agreements made during the Uruguay round, with re-
gards to agriculture, are inconsistent with Article XIII.2 16 The
AB held that the allocation of quota shares to some Member
States having a substantial interest in supplying the EU with ba-
nanas was inconsistent with GATT Article XIII obligations. 217 Al-
though Article XIII(2) does not expressly mention Member
States that do not have a substantial interest, they too should be
allowed to benefit from the non-discrimination clause.
218
Article XIII requires the non-discriminatory application of
quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas.2 19 Specifically, Article
XIII(1) asserts that the importation and exportation of Member
State product is prohibited only when the importation of a like
product from a third country is similarly prohibited or re-
stricted.22 ° Under Article XIII(2), the distribution of a product
must be in such a way that Member States would have reasonably
expected their respective share absent the existence of the re-
215. See 1997 AB Report para. 155 (noting that all GAIT provisions apply except
where specifically covered by Agreement on Agriculture).
216. See id. para. 157 (stating that nothing in Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of Agreement on
Agriculture specifically deals with tariff quotas and contracting parties would have been
more explicit if they intended to address this issue).
217. Id. para. 162.
218. See id. para. 161 (reasoning that when implementing tariff quotas and import
restrictions, contracting parties must adhere to Article XIII(2); even though Article
XIII(2) does not have specific rules for those Member States that do not have signifi-
cant interest in supplying product at involved, these Members must still be subject to
follow principles of non-discrimination). According to the AB, to not apply Article
XIII(2) without distinguishing whether or not a contracting party has substantial inter-
est is considered a violation of Article XIII(1). Id. GATT art. XIII(2). Article XIII(2)
states "In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a
distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares
which various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such
restrictions ...." Id.
219. GATT art. XIII.
220. GATT art. XIII(1). Article XIII(1) states:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory or any other contracting party or
on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other con-
tracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries
or the exportation- of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohib-
ited or restricted.
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strictions.221
The AB upheld the Panel's ruling that tariff reallocation
quota rules under the BFA are inconsistent with Article XIII(1)
and Article XIII(2).222 The rules allow BFA countries to request
the reallocation of unused shares to other BFA countries.22 3 In
addition, these reallocation rules exclude non-BFA banana sup-
pliers, to prevent them from taking advantage of the. unused
shares. 224 As a result, the AB believed that the BFA does not
similarly restrict the imports from BFA and non-BFA Member
States and is inconsistent with Article XIII (1). 225 In addition, the
AB reasoned that the re-allocation of these unused shares to
other BFA countries, at the exclusion of non-BFA countries,
does not qualify as an allocation of tariff quota shares that would
be expected by a Member State should no such restrictions ex-
ist.2 2 ' Therefore, according to the AB, the BFA reallocation
rules are also inconsistent with the ideals of Article XIII(2).2 2 v
The AB held that under Lom6, the EU must provide duty-
free access to traditional ACP bananas. 22' EU should allot
90,000 tons of non-traditional ACP bananas and provide a mar-
gin of tariff preference of 100 ECU per ton for alladditional
non-traditional ACP bananas. 229  The EU must allocate tariff
shares to the traditional ACP states in accordance with those
countries pre-1991 best-ever export volumes.2 30 Protocol Five of
Lom6 IV stipulated that no ACP state could be placed in a less
favorable position then it is at present or was in the past with
regard to access in the traditional banana markets. 231 Article
221. GATT art. XIII(2).
222. 1997 AB Report para. 163.
223. See id. (commenting that under BFA reallocation rules, portion of tariff quota
that goes unused by BFA country assigned that particular tariff portion may reallocate
unused portion to other BFA countries at joint request of all participating BFA coun-
tries).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 173 (holding that duty-free access is considered Lomi requirement).
229. See id. (holding that import allocation and tariff for non-traditional ACP ba-
nanas is required under Lom6).
230. Id. paras. 172, 178. See id. para. 178 (stating that duty-free allocation is re-
quired by EU under Lome, but EU is not required to allocate quota shares in excess of
pre-1991 best-ever export volumes).
231. Lom6n IV protocol 5, art. 1.
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168(2) (a) (ii) of Lom6 IV seeks to ensure more favorable treat-
ment of all ACP products, including bananas, that come under a
common market and are subject to import restrictions, versus
the treatment given to third country bananas that benefit from
the MFN clause for like products.23 2 Protocol Five specifically
deals with the favorable treatment of traditional ACP bananas,
whereas Article 168(2) (a) (ii) covers the favorable treatment of
all ACP bananas. 23 The AB reasoned that even prior to the en-
actment of Regulation 404/93, the traditional ACP countries en-
joyed preferential duty-free access for their bananas. 234 Thus,
the EU's duty-free treatment was within the parameters of the
Lom6 IV-the continuation of favorable treatment towards the
ACP countries was no less favorable than in the past or at the
235present time.
Article 168 neither specifies that any particular measure is
the only applicable measure granting preferential export treat-
ment in the case at bar, nor does it stipulate what constitutes a
necessary measure of preferential treatment under Lome IV.2 3 6
The EU's regime grants duty-free access to 90,000 tons of non-
traditional ACP bananas, a tariff preference of 100ECU per ton
and a beyond-quota rate of ECU693 per ton.2 3 7 Under MFN
treatment, the in-quota tariff for. third country bananas238 are
ECU75 per ton while beyond-quota imports is taxed at ECU793
23per ton. s Such regulations are, obviously, more favorable than
what is permitted under Article 168(2) (a) (ii), which is applica-
ble in the case at bar.24 0 Therefore, the AB reasoned that the
232. Lom6 IV art. 168(2) (a) (ii). Article 168(2) (a) (ii) states that concerning prod-
ucts originating in ACP nations "for products other than those referred to under [sub-
division I], the Community shall take the necessary measures to ensure more favourable
treatment than that granted to third countries benefiting from the most-favoured-na-
tion clause for the same products."
233. See Lome IV protocol 5; Lome V art. 168(2) (a) (ii); see also 1997 AB Report
para. 172 (reasoning that with regard to traditional ACP bananas, Article 168(2) (a) (ii)
reinforces Protocol Five.
234. See 1997 AB Report para. 172 (arguing that it was given rule that under Lome
IV ACP nations enjoyed duty free access prior to EEC 404/93, therefore duty-free access
provided under EEC 404/93 was seen as required by tenets of Lom6 IV).
235. Id.
236. Id. See generally Lom( IV art. 168.
237. 1997 AB Report para. 173.
238. See Bustamante, supra note 2, at 540 (stating that third country bananas are
non-ACP bananas produced in Latin America).
239. 1997 AB Report para. 173.
240. Id.
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measures taken by the EU were necessary and required under
the Lom6 waiver.241 In addition, the AB held that the EU need
not allocate shares to ACPs exporting non-traditional ACP ba-
nanas, nor maintain import licensing procedures applicable to
third countries and non-traditional bananas.24 2
The AB relied on the European Court ofJustice to justify its
ruling that the EU's allocation of shares for traditional ACP sup-
plier states was required under Lom6. 24' The Court of Justice
held that the EU may permit access and free duty only to ba-
nanas imported from traditional ACP supplier states at zero duty
in the best year prior to 1991.244 The AB held that the EU's
allocation of shares to certain ACP Member States, in excess of
their pre-1991 best-ever export volumes so as to reflect the in-
creases in future trading, as unnecessary. 24 The AB held also
that future increases in trade were speculative at best.
246
Concerning the allocation of tariff shares to non-traditional
ACP countries, the AB simply held that under the applicable
rule of Article 168(2) (a) (ii), the more favorable treatment of
non-traditional ACP bananas could be accomplished without al-
locating tariff quota shares. 247 Concerning the import licensing
241. See 1997 AB Report para. 173 (arguing that article 168(2) (a) (ii) does not
stipulate that only one specific kind of trade measure is necessary for non-traditional
ACP bananas; EU could have devised other measures that would also provide more
favorable treatment, but measures at issue here are sufficient to be declared necessary
measures as prescribed under article 168(2) (a) (ii)).
242. Id. paras. 176, 178. See id. para. 176 (holding that while only article
168(2) (a) (ii) applies to non-traditional ACP bananas, this statute can be followed with-
out allocating tariff quota shares; therefore quota shares should not be required).
243. Id. para. 174.
244. Id. at para. 174. See Germany v. Council, Case C-280/93, [1994] E.C.R., I-
4973 (stating that under Article 1 of Protocol 5, must permit access, free of customs
duty, only to bananas actually imported, at zero duty, in pre-1991 best year amounts
from each ACP State that is traditional supplier). In Germany v. Council, Germany
challenged the legality of Regulation 404/93 under the EEC Treaty. Id.
245. See id. para. 175 (holding that tariff quota shares in excess of pre-1991 best-
ever export volumes that reflect potential future increases in trade are unnecessary
guarantees that traditional ACPs are not placed in less favorable position before 1991).
The AB holds that the only difference would be if prior to 1991, the ACPs had a guaran-
tee that their traditional markets would export quantities that may have been a result of
the investments they made some time in the future; but this is not the case in reality.
Id.
246. Id.
247. See id. para. 176 (reiterating that although only article 168(2) (a) (ii) applies to
non-traditional bananas-not broadly constructed Article 1 under Protocol 5, more
favorable treatment could be provided for non-traditional bananas without allocating
tariff quota shares).
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measures that apply to third country and non-traditional ACP
banana exporters, the AB reasoned that some form of an import
licensing system was needed to allocate traditional ACP bananas
in the amount of their pre-1991 best ever export volumes. 248 Ac-
cording to the AB, however, the licensing procedures in the ba-
•nana regime appeared to favor EU operators that market tradi-
tional ACP bananas, which amounted to cross-subsidization.249
Lom6 IV does not require cross-subsidization and, therefore, the
import licensing procedures here were not required under
Lomb.2 5 °
The AB reversed the Panel's ruling that Lom6 IV allows in-
consistencies with Article XIII(l), allowing the EU to allocate
shares to the traditional ACP states.2 5 ' In its report, the AB rea-
soned that the Lom6 waiver specifically applied to the provisions
of Article I to the extent necessary to allow ACP states more pref-
erential treatment of products they produce.252 The AB dis-
agreed with the Panel's need to create a real effect of Lom6 IV
and its relationship between Articles I and XIII of GATT.253 On
its face, Lom6 IV only applied to Article I and not to any other
provision or related agreement. 254 Even where Article I and XIII
bear a close relationship the Lome waiver does not extend to
248. Id. para. 177.
249. Id. See Terence P. Stewart and Timothy C. Brightbill, Trade Law and Competi-
tion Policy in Regional Trade Agreements, 27 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 937, 939 (1996)
(arguing that cross-subsidization creates fallacious allotment of resources and leads to
inaccurate outcomes in competition between two companies). Cross-subsidization oc-
curs in only two instances: (1) where producer utilizes supracompetitive profits from
one or more other products to cover the insufficient profits (or losses) of the subsidized
product; or (2) where producer's overall return on funds invested is inadequate, and
company is engaged in "going out of business" mode. Id. SeeJohn Temple Lang, Defin-
ing Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential
Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 437, 519 (1994) (explaining that cross-subsidization is
considered illegal when low price is charged during course of economic competition
and is exclusionary, or when high price is charged during non-competitive period and
that price is exploitative).
250. See 1997 AB Report para. 177 (holding that nothing in language of Lom6 IV
implies that cross-subsidization is required).
251. Id. para. 188.
252. See id. paras. 180-188 (holding that wording of LomE IV is unambiguous). See
generally Lom6 IV.
253. See id. paras. 181-184 (finding it difficult to incorporate GATI Article XIII
with GATT's limited experience with interpreting waivers, strict regulations of waivers
under WTO Agreement, history behind Lom6 waiver, and GATT's limited experience
with granting waivers for obligations under Article XIII).
254. Id. para. 183.
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Article XIII according to -the AB.255
The AB upheld the Panel's ruling that the non-discrimina-
tion provisions in GATT Articles I(1) and XIII applied to rele-
vant EU regimes, regardless of whether more than one regime
that controls the importation, distribution, and sale of bananas
existed. 25 6 The AB reasoned that the provisions apply to all ba-
nana imports regardless of how the imports are categorized, oth-
erwise, the purpose of a non-discrimination clause would be eas-
ily defeated if such a provision could only apply within a regime
that a Member State created. 257 The AB held that both Articles
I(1) and XIII apply to the point that obligations are waived
under the Lom6 convention, regardless of the origin of the ba-
nanas or the basis for imposing restrictions on those bananas. 258
2. EU Response
Following the WTO's 1997 ruling, the EU attempted to
modify its banana regime in conformity with WTO standards,
the single European market goal, and the Lom6 IV provisions.259
In 1998, the EU proposed to continue with a tariff quota system
that distinguished between the product's source.2 6 ° Within the
EU, the traditional ACP suppliers would still be allowed up to
857,700 tons and the Latin American suppliers allotment would
be increased to 2,200,000 tons. 26 1 Latin American countries
would have a reduced tariff duty of ECU75 per ton initially, with
a ECU765 per ton duty for every ton over the quota.2 6 2 The ACP
countries' quota would now be for all ACP exporters as a whole.
The EU, therefore, proposed ECU370,000,000 in financial assis-
255. See id. (holding that although articles I and XIII are both non-discrimination
clauses, their relationship does not necessitate that waiver from article I obligations is
automatic waiver from article XIII obligations).
256. Id. para. 191.
257. See id. para. 190 (commenting that Member state could easily get around
GATT's non-discrimination provisions and provisions of multilateral agreements if
those provisions only applied within regime established by particular Member state).
258. Id. para. 191.
259. See GODFREY, supra note 172 (commenting that EU rejected free-market sys-
tem supported by proponents for Latin American banana producers and will continue
to use managed market system).
260. See id. (stating that allocation for bananas produced within EU would be
854,000 tons; EU producers include Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Canary Islands).
261. Id.
262. See id. (noting that each Latin American country with substantial interest in
banana market would be given specific share of total 2,200,000 ton quota).
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tance over a ten year period to alleviate any economic hardship
this proposal may cause.263
C. 1999 Controversy
Ecuador alleged that the EU's revised regime 2 1 was the
same With a few exceptions. 26" Ecuador noted the elimination of
individual country quotas in the ACP allotment for traditional
ACP bananas. 266  Ecuador also noted there was no longer a
90,000 ton cap on the amount allotted to non-traditional ba-
nanas, that non-traditional bananas can enter the EU duty-free
under the "other" category containing third country quotas; in
addition, that the tariff preference for these bananas had been
increased to EUR200 per ton.26 7 There were no longer country-
specific allocations to non-traditional suppliers.268
1. Proceedings
On August 18, 1998, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mex-
ico and the United States, acting jointly and severally, requested
a meeting with the EU to implement the DSB's recommenda-
tions concerning the banana regime.269 One month later the
parties met and the consultations reached an impasse. 7 ° On
November 13, 1998, Ecuador requested to renew consultations
with the EU. 2 71 These consultations were held ten days later and
resulted in another impasse. 272 Finally, on December 18, 1998,
263. Id.
264. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/RW/ECU
(April 12, 1999) 1, 3 [hereinafter 1999 Panel Report] (stating revised regime in ques-
tion is that applied from January 1, 1999 with regard to following amendments: EC
Regulation 1637/98, which amended EEC 404/93 EEC Regulation 2362, which stipu-
lated rules for implementation of EEC 404/93).
265. Id.
266. See id. (noting that EU provision for increase in traditional ACP bananas allot-
ment is not provided).
267. See id. at 4 (noting that non-traditional bananas are limited to 240,748 tons or
9.43% of the 2.553 million ton tariff quota). Although the net weight of the Latin
American banana quota is 2.2 million, the EC, under Regulation 1637, allots an addi-
tional 353,000 tons which is considered an autonomous tariff quota. Id. at 3.
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id. at 2.
270. See id. (noting that consultations were held on September 17, 1998).
271. Id.
272. See id. (noting that consultations were held between EU and Ecuador on No-
vember 23, 1998).
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Ecuador requested that the original panel reconvene to discuss
the implementation of the DSB's recommendations. 273  The
Panel convened onJanuary 12, 1999, and submitted its report on
April 6, 1999.274
a. Arguments
Ecuador challenged the revised banana regime in accor-
dance with GATT Articles I and XIII. 275 Ecuador requested the
Panel to reaffirm its prior holdings, which were upheld and
modified by the AB. 2 76 Ecuador also requested that the Panel
provide the EU with more explicit guidelines for compliance
with its rulings and recommendations.277 The EU requested that
the Panel reject Ecuador's claims and hold that the EU com-
plied with the Panel's 1997 rulings and recommendations.2 78
273. See id. (requesting examination of implementation of DSB recommendations
pursuant to article 21(5) of DSU); see also DSU art. 21 (5). Article 21(5) states:
5. Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a cov-
ered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations
and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dis-
pute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the origi-
nal panel.
The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral
of the matter to it. When the panel considers that it cannot provide its
report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the rea-
sons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it
will submit its report.
Id.
274. Id. at 3 (noting that under DSU Article 10, Brazil, Belize, Cameroon, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, C6te D'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Ja-
maica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines re-
served third party right to be heard by Panel); see also DSU art. 10. Article 10(2) states
that "[a]ny Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having
notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a "third party")
shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to
the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall
be reflected in the panel report."
275. See id. at 10 (asserting.that revised regime, particularly licensing system, still
violated CATS Articles 2 and 17). Ecuador argues that its wholesale suppliers cannot,
obtain import license on conditions as favorable as ACP suppliers. Id. at 91.
276. Id. at 10.
277. Id.
278. Id. With regards the alleged inconsistencies under GATS, the EC's arguments
include: that GATS does not guarantee a specified amount of market shares at a desig-
nated time; that, under the Licensing Agreement, it has the right to base future alloca-
tions of licenses on the maximization of licenses already given. Id. at 93. See id. at 92-93
(explaining EU arguments that their licensing system conforms with GATS).
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i. Article I
With regards to traditional and non-traditional ACP ba-
nanas, the Latin American countries argued that the revised sys-
tem was inconsistent with GATT Article I, the DSB's prior Panel
rulings, and the AB rulings. 27 9 Ecuador argued that the 857,000
tons allocation was the same amount as the total sum of the pre-
vious individual traditional ACP country allocations given before
January 1, 1999.280 Under the revised system, the 857,700 ton
allocation would be distributed to traditional ACP countries as a
cumulative share. 281  Ecuador asserted that the allocation still
exceeded each country's best-ever level before 1991 because, in
theory, each traditional ACP supplier is allowed to ship 857,000
tons of bananas duty-free.282 Ecuador argued that, without indi-
vidual limitations, the revised regime exceeded the scope of
Lomie and still violated Article 1.285
Ecuador maintained that the non-traditional banana tariffs
were not required by the Lom6 waiver.2 84 Under the revised re-
gime, the 90,000 ton cap on duty-free exports was eliminated
and the over-quota tariff was increased to EUR200 per ton.28 5
Ecuador reasoned that the AB's decision that the EU was not
limited to one form of a tariff quota preference, did not bestow a
carte blanche to the EU to grant more preferences under their
regime.2 6 As a result, the EU's revised regime with the ACP
states is illegal under Lom6 IV and according to previous DSB
reports.287
279. Id. at 10.
280. See id. (noting that Panel and AB already ruled that allocations exceeded
Lom6 requirements).
281. See GODFREY, supra note 172.
282. 1999 Panel Report, at 10.
283. See id. at 11 (arguing also that inconsistencies could not be remedied by cur-
tailing allocations of less efficient traditional suppliers). Ecuador noted that Lom( IV
permitted traditional suppliers to export bananas only up to that country's pre-1991
best-ever amount, and that some of these traditional suppliers would lose access to the
EU because purchasers would naturally buy from the more efficient and cheaper sup-
pliers. Id.
284. See id. at 13 (noting it was unjustifiable to expand preferences from old system
into revised system; neither prior DSB ruling nor Lom6 waiver justifies revised tariffs).
285. Id. at 10.
286. See id. at 14 (arguing that 1997 AB's rationale that other tariff preferences
could have been chosen was used by EU to justify its insertion of similar, but more
significant preferences under new regime).
287. Id.
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The EU argued that Protocol Five of Lom6 IV required it to
provide duty free access for all traditional ACP bananas. 28  The
EU asserted the AB held that pre-1991 best ever import volumes
permitted traditional ACP banana imports beyond the tariff
quota.2 9  Therefore, according to the EU, a .maximum of
857,700 tons was within the Lom6 IV requirements.29 °
Concerning non-traditional ACP imports, the EU -argued
that the AB never established a ceiling on the preferences that
the EU could grant to non-traditional ACP suppliers in 1997.291
The AB only had to determine whether the measures imple-
mented by the EU were necessary under the tenets of Lom6 IV,
since the AB previously held that the scope of Article
168(2) (a) (ii) of Lom6 IV allowed for many different preferences
from which to choose.29 2 Article 168(2)(a)(ii), therefore, did
not prescribe a limit on volume allotment or tariff amounts for
products imported beyond the allotted quota.29 3 Ecuador and
the other Latin American countries argued that the EU abused
its power, granted by Lom6 V, by relinquishing the 90,000 ton
cap on duty-free imports and the EUR200 per ton tariff prefer-
ence for imports above the quota. 29 4 The EU argued that the
elimination of the cap did not go beyond the prescription under
Article 168 and that the increase in tariff preference to EUR200
was only done to balance what it lost by eliminating the 90,000
ton cap.29 5 According to the EU, it did not give preferential
288. Id. at 11 (arguing that duty-free treatment was in addition to requirements
under Article 168(2)(a)(ii) and therefore, corresponded with limitations on volume
that Lom6 prescribed).
289. See id. (arguing that it was justified in setting 857,700 ton maximum for tradi-
tional ACP bananas based on AB Report).
290. Id. See id. at 81 (arguing that its pre-1991 best ever export volume totaled
952,939 tons, due to an extra 100,000 tons from investments which AB held could not
be factored into coming up with pre-1991 best ever amount). Even without the extra
volume, the EU still feels that the export volume of 857,700 is justifiable. Id. at 81-82.
291. See id. at 14 (explaining that 92,000 tons quota and 100ECU tariff did not
indicate upper limit for non-traditional banana allocation).
292. See id. (stating that AB had to determine whether measures fulfilled what was
prescribed under Article 168(2) (a) (ii)).
293. See id. (arguing that Lom6 covers preferential treatment including that pre-
scribed by EU to extent that application of Lom6 waiver was contingent on finding that
preferential was considered required by Lom6).
294. Id.
295. See id. at 15 (arguing that EU arrangement with suppliers to increase margin
of preference for beyond-quota imports, 100ECU, serves as partial compensation for
loss of 90,000 quota allocation).
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treatment towards non-traditional ACP bananas. 216
ii. Article XIII
. Ecuador asserted that the revised banana regime did not
conform with the tenets of GATT Article XIII.2 9 7 Under the re-
gime 857,700 tons were allotted, duty free, to traditional ACP
bananas while 2,553,000 tons were allowed, preferentially, to
other banana importers. 298 The revised regime maintained a
tariff-rate, quota system that Ecuador felt offered more favorable
treatment'of traditional ACP bananas.299 Ecuador argued that
favoritism towards the product of a group of countries, even
where there existed a lack of such favoritism towards a single
country, is prohibited under Article XIII (1).o Ecuador argued
that Article XIII, as held by the original Panel, did not allow the
allocation of shares to some non-substantial suppliers, while not
allocating shares to others.3 ° '
More specifically, Ecuador asserted that the EU violated Ar-
ticle .XIII(2), which stipulated that trade distribution must ap-
proach, as closely as possible, the portion of shares that Member
States should expect in the absence of such trade preferences or
restrictions. 30 2 Ecuador furtherasserted that the EU banana re-
gime undermined the tenets of Article XIII(2) (d), which stipu-
lated that the allocation among suppliers of any product must be
based on proportions allocated during a previous representative
period that considers any factors that affected or are presently
affecting that product. 3 The EU used the period of 1994 to
296. Id.
297. See id. (adding that revised regime aggravated problems with previous regime
concerning Article XIII).
298. See id. (arguing that allotment had not changed from previous regime).
299. Id. See id. at*22 (arguing that Ecuador's allocation under revised regime was
unfair based on objective criteria such as trend of Ecuador's exports and that Ecuador
retains larger share of global market-which is beyond EU market).
300. Id. at 15, 22.
301. See id. at 16, 22 (arguing that EU allocated individual shares to Costa Rica and
Columbia, both substantial suppliers, and to Nicaragua and Venezuela, both non-sub-
stantial suppliers, while Ecuador did not have specific allocation and was relegated into
"other" category).'
302. See id. at 22 (asserting that its respective share is very limited to what it would
have expected without regime). Ecuador cited proof that its share of the EU market
and of the world market greatly surpassed what it is presently allocated under the EU
banana regime. Id. at 22-23.
303. Id. at 24. GATT art. 13(2)(d). Article 13(2)(d) states:
(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the con-
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1996 to devise its allocations to suppliers not classified in the
traditional banana category. °4 According to Ecuador, aspects of
the BFA and the licensing system marred utility of this time pe-
riod; thus 1994 to 1996 was not a representative period under
Article XIII(2) (d) 0 5 Since using a pre-1991 period to deter-
mine best ever allocation could mean any year prior to 1991,
Ecuador argued the older the information, the less representa-
tive that information would be of current conditions in the ba-
nana markets.306
In an answer to Ecuador's allegations under GATT Article
XIII, the EU asserted several defenses.3 0 7 The EU argued that,
under Article XIII, the 857,700 ton quota for traditional ACP
exports falls outside of the MFN quota of 2,553,000 tons and Ec-
uador should not have a stake in it.3 0 8 According to the EU the
traditional ACP quota was an upper limit on duty-free tariff pref-
erences for this kind of import. 309 The EU also argued that the
elimination of the allotments to individual, traditional ACPs
tracting party applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect
to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other contracting parties
having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In cases
in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party
concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in
supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by
such contracting parties during a previous representative period, of the
total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken
of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the
trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed
which would prevent any contracting party from utilizing fully the share
of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to it, subject to
importation being made within any prescribed period to which the quota
may relate.
Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 23 (arguing that allocation based on pre-1991 best-ever amounts was so
high, it could not be justified under GATT article XIII; if 1994-1996 period applied to
Ecuador and other countries was applied to traditional suppliers, traditional suppliers
would get lower share whereas respective shares belonging to Ecuador and third coun-
tries would increase). Ecuador reasoned that it was unclear as to whether any country-
share allotment could be formulated based on a given representative period, in addi-
tion to a general conformity under article XIII(2). Id.
306. See id. at 23 (noting that because productive efficiency and capacity oscillated,
older representative period would be less accurate; Article XIII does not exist to gener-
ate trade preferences factored by past trading patterns).
307. Id. at 17.
308. Id. at 18.
309. See id. (noting that this tariff preference is required under Lome IV and not
under Article XIII).
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should not adversely affect Ecuador's export interests.31 ° The
EU argued that the price and volume of traditional ACP exports
should bear no consequence on the price and volume of Ecua-
dor's exports.31 1
Concerning Ecuador's specific claim under Article XIII(2),
the EU argued that dispensing country-specific allocations to
suppliers contradictory to Article XIII is prohibited based on the
prior AB ruling. 12 The EU claimed, therefore, to be justified in
assigning a collective allocation.313 In addition, the EU claimed
its decision to base the collective allocation on the years 1994
through 1996 was because this time period was the most recent
data upon which it could rely.
314
b. Holding
Concerning the asserted Article XIII claims, the Panel ruled
that the 857,700 ton volume limit on traditional ACP exports ap-
plies to Article XIII.3 15 In addition, the Panel held that there
was no need for ACP import quotas to count against the tariff
quota allotted under the MFN clause. 16 Based on prior rulings,
the Panel held that the rudimentary principle, under Article
XIII, required that like products be treated equally, regardless of
origin and no matter how Member States classified the im-
ports. 7 Again, based on prior rulings that Lom6 IV did not ex-
tend to Article XIII, any inconsistencies that existed under Arti-
cle XIII cannot be waived under Lom&.3 1  The Panel held that
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 74 (arguing that AB report mandates it to provide collective allocation
of 857,700 tons to traditional suppliers).
313. Id. at 21.
314. See id. at 24 (explaining that 1994-1996 period was most favorable to Ecuador
based on data available at given time and that data from 1997 was available, but it was
provisional at time Regulation 2362 was drafted).
315. See id. at 71-72 (holding that because tariff quota is generally defined as quan-
titative limit on specific tariff rate's availability). Panel also held that GATT article XIII
applies to tariff quotas. Id. See GATT XIII(5). Article XIII(5) states that "[t]he provi-
sions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any con-
tracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend
to export restrictions."
316. Id.
317. See id. at 72 (explaining that Member state could avoid non-discrimination
provisions by choosing different legal justification for implanting import restrictions or
tariff rates, thus there would be no purpose for non-discrimination provisions).
318. Id.
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ACP suppliers had access to another category under the MFN
quota once they exhausted their 857,700 ton quota, whereas
non-substantial suppliers had no access to the 857,700 ton tariff
quota once they depleted their MFN tariff quota of 240,748 was
unfair.31
According to the Panel, country specific allocations to sub-
stantial suppliers were inconsistent with Article XIII(2).32 - The
Panel held that although the use of quantitative restrictions is
generally prohibited, the EU should apply these quantitative re-
strictions, where it is prohibited, in a non-discriminatory: manner
that is least disruptive to trade.321 In addition, the EU must allo-
cate quotas based on the amount of shares that a Member State
would have expected in the absence of such special restric-
tions.322 The Panel required the EU to use a representative pe-
riod that is recent and undistorted by restrictions in order to
determine the proper allocation amounts.3 23 Given that the rep-
resentative period of 1994-1996 was during the time that the BFA
was in effect, the Panel held this period of time was not a truly
representative period upon which to allocate quotas under the
tenets of Article XIII. 324
Under Article I, the 857,700 ton allocation may be consid-
ered within the scope of the Lom6 IV, as long as the allocation is
based on pre-1991 best ever exports.3 25 The Panel held the argu-
ment asserting that Lom6 IV required a collective allocation of
the 857,700 tons was not within the scope of Protocol Five.3 26
319. See id. at 73 (arguing that non-substantial suppliers lacked access to 857,700
tariff quota once they used up their allocated volume, therefore similar restriction does
not exist).
320. Id. at 74.
321. Id. at 75.
322. GATT art. XIII(2).
323. 1999 Panel Report, at 75. See id. at 76 (holding that if out-of-date or distorted
data are used, where relevant market is restricted, use of that data misses purpose of
Article XIII (2) (d)).
324. Id. at 77-78 (holding that before 1993, the EU applied different national im-
port regimes where some states applied import restrictions, while others used tariff-only
or duty-free systems; therefore anytime before 1993 could not serve as representative
period). Under Article XIII, even where imports from some countries were formulated
based on data from less distorted time periods, significant distortions from a particular
group of suppliers will impact all substantial and non-substantial suppliers within a
given product market; therefore 1994-1996 is not a truly representative period because
it used data at a time prior to implementation of the BFA. Id.
325. See id. at 103 (excluding investments from formulation).
326. Id.
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Subsequently, the treatment of imports from traditional ACP
countries in excess of the pre-19 91 best ever volumes is not re-
quired under Lom6 IV and, therefore, is inconsistent with Arti-
cle I(1).327 Finally, under GATT Article I, Article 168 of Lom6
IV covers the preferences for non-traditional ACP exports at a
zero tariff, as well as the increase of the beyond-quota tariff for
non-traditional exports to EUR200 per ton. z8
On the issue of collective allocations, the Panel believed
that Protocol Five required the allocation of shared to tradi-
tional suppliers based on pre-1991 best ever volumes, but it did
not require certain traditional ACP suppliers to exceed that vol-
ume under the revised regime.3 29 The Panel held that the exis-
tence of a collective allocation would allow more substantial and
traditionally competitive suppliers to exceed the pre-1991 best
ever requirement and gain an advantage over the less substantial
suppliers.33 ° Therefore, this collective allocation went beyond
the scope of Lom6 and subsequently violate Article I(1).
Concerning non-traditional imports, the Panel looked to
Article 168(2) (a) (ii). 32 The Panel reasoned that the language
of the statute allowed for the favorable treatment for all ACP
bananas versus the treatment given to third country bananas
benefiting under the MFN clause. 3 According to the Panel,
the original allocation of 90,000 tons of non-traditional ACP ba-
nanas duty free and the EUR100 per ton tariff charged to be-
yond quota bananas met the language of the statute. 4
327. Id.
328. See id. at 104 (concluding that all violations nullify or impair benefits allowed
to complainants under GATT 1994 and must be brought into conformity within tenets
of GATT 1994).
329. Id.
330. See id. at 82-83 (referring to AB's opinion that Lom6 specifically refers to
country-specific pre-1991 best-ever amount).
331. Id. at 82.
332. Id. See generally Lom6 IV art. 168(2) (a) (ii).
333. Id. at 83-84.
334. Id. See id. at 82-83 (noting Panel had to determine whether this allocation was
necessary under Lom6 IV). The Panel agreed with the AB holding that Article 168 did
not limit what was necessary as more favorable treatment. Id. at 83. Because the Panel
already held that the preferential tariff of 90,000 tons without any duty was inconsistent
under the GAT[, the Panel held that the EU should be allowed some leeway to create
more consistent, preferential treatment. Id. at 83-84. The idea that non-traditional
ACP countries export bananas at zero tariff within the "other" category under the MFN
clause is not unreasonable under Article 168 according to the Panel. Id. at 84. There-
fore, the preferential tariff survives under the Lome IV. Id.
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The Panel also ruled on Ecuador's complaint the increased
tariff of non-traditional ACP imports to EUR200 per ton as not
beyond the scope of Lom6IV.335 Given the liberal interpreta-
tion of what constitutes a necessary measure to insure favorable
treatment for all ACP bananas, the EU's increase of the beyond
quota tariff to EUR200 per ton in order to counter-balance the
elimination of the 90,000 ton volume under the MFN quota, is
conceivable.336 With the 1999 Panel ruling, the WTO also gave
the United States permission to levy a US$191,400,000 retalia-
tory sanction against the EU. 37
2. EU Response
In November of 1999, the United States and Latin America
rejected another EU proposal." 8 That proposal called for the
EU to move into a tariff-only system by January 1, 2006."' 9
Under this proposed tariff quota system, there would be a
2,553,000 ton quota with a tariff of EUR75 per ton, which would
be open to all suppliers.34 Under the protection of the Lom6
waiver, the ACP suppliers would still have duty free access to the
EU market. 3
41
3. Recent Developments
On, May 3, 2000 and May 8, 2000, the WTO's General
Council approved a series of measures that address the needs of
both developing countries and least-developed countries. 34 2 The
measures call for meetings to find plausible solutions to the eco-
nomic concerns of these underdeveloped nations.343 These
meetings and any resulting resolutions would subsequently serve
335. Id. at 85.
336. Id. at 84. See id. at 104 (holding that aspects of regime's licensing scheme
violated GATS Article 2 and 17).
337. See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Wins Round in Trade War with Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
23, 1999, at C2 (noting sanction as compensation for trade lost by U.S. banana growers
in Latin America as consequence of banana regime).
338. U.S., Latin America Reject EU Banana Proposal, ST. LucIA ONE STOP NEws, Nov.
17, 1999, at http://www.sluonestop.com/newsl.htm.
339. See id. (noting that this move would occur after transition period under com-
plex tariff-quota system).
340. Id.
341. See id. (adding that U.S. retaliatory sanctions are still in effect).
342. WTO, Moore Hails General Council Outcome, May 8, 2000, at http://wto.org/
english/news-e/presOOe/prl 77.htm.
343. See id. (stating that meetings were scheduled for June 2000).
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to boost the public's diminished confidence in the WTO and the
international trade system. 34 4 The Member States, specifically,
held that continued technical assistance needs to improve; they
sought a significant increase in financial aid by CHF10,000,000
over a three year period. 45
The WTO also reported that Canada, the EU, Japan, and
the United States, among other members, will create and imple-
ment preferential, tariff, and quota free measures that will be
consistent with international treaty regulations and domestic
regulations on products with an LDC origin.346
In October of 2000, the European Commission proposed a
new compromise to the existing banana regime. 347  The new
proposal is a new system that would allocate import licenses on a
first-come, first-served basis. 34" The new system would be tempo-
rary until 2006.14 1 In January 2001, Chiquita filed suit, against
the EU, alleging that the banana regime is illegal.35 ° Chiquita
announced in mid-January, 2001 that it may have to seek Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy protection as a result of the on-going banana
dispute .351
344. Id.
345. Id. See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 839, 950 (2000)
(discussing that U.S President William Clinton signed into law Trade and Development
Act of 2000 (H.R. 434), focuses on amending GSP to extend duty-free treatment to
specified products from sub-Saharan African countries); see also Trade and Develop-
ment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251
346. See Michael Moore, WTO Now in Much Better Shape with New Agreements, May 3,
2000, at http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/spmm-e/spmm28_e.htm (commenting
that this news is good starting point).
347. See Geoff Winestock, Europe Proposes Compromise in Dispute With Washington Over
Banana Quotas, WALL ST. J, Oct. 5, 2000, at A21.
348. Id.
349. See id. (commenting that transitory system would be replaced by tariff-only
system). The plan is to be implemented April 2001. Id.
350. See Jonathan Eig & Geoff Weinstock, Chiquita Sues EC Over Limitations on Ba-
nana Trade, WALL ST. J., January 26, 2001, at B5 (stating that Chiquita has filed suit
alleging that EU illegally restricted banana imports). The case has been filed in the
Court of First Instance. Id. It seeks U.S.$525,000,000 and reserves the right to seek
future damages contingent upon the banana regime's existence. Id.
351. Id. According to Chiquita's President and Chief Operating Officer, Steven G.
Warshaw, Chiquita did not file suit only for the money. Id. Chiquita wanted the Euro-
pean Commission to propose and adopt a WTO-compatible regime. Id. But see id. (ex-
plaining EU spokesman Anthony Gooch's view that Chiquita's financial woes are not
primarily attributed to banana regime given that Chiquita's competitors like Dole and
Del Monte Food Co. are in adequate financial shape). Dole also has filed seven sepa-
rate claims in the European Court of First Instance seeking damages because of the
banana regime. Id.
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Neither side to the banana dispute has yet to produce a res-
olution that will serve to please all involved parties, although a
number alternatives have been proposed in recent years. 52 Ad-
ditional, alternative regimes have been proposed, in addition to
the aforementioned proposal to maintain a temporary tariff-
quota regime pending the complete transition to a tariff-only
scheme.353 These options include: maintenance of the status
quo;3 5 4 the removal of Lom6 trade preferences and the provision
of a financial aid package only;35 5 the requirement of all ACPs to
extend reciprocity of open market access and not tax the EU
after a specified amount of time;35 6 and the regionalization of
Lom. 3 57
352. See generally Bhala, supra note 345, at 952 (commenting that settlement has
not yet been reached in dispute).
353. See generally U.S., Latin America Reject EU Banana Proposal, ST. LucIA ONE STOP
NEWS, Nov. 17, 1999, at http://www.sluonestop.com/newsl.htm (discussing proposed
move to tariff-only system by 2006).
354. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 92; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER ON
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ACP COUNTRIES ON THE EVE OF THE
21ST CENTURY-CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP, CHAPTER IV-To-
WARDS A NEW PARTNERSHIP (1996) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER CHAPTER IV] (noting that
one obvious option would be to maintain the current non-reciprocal ACP-EU agree-
ment). A renewable waiver would still be necessary since the status quo affords the ACP
countries differentiated treatment. GREEN PAPER CHAPTER IV, supra 354. The advan-
tages and disadvantages to the status quo have already been discussed in the disrupting
parties' arguments. Id.
355. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 92-93; GREEN PAPER CHAPTER IV, supra note
354. EU concessions would be unilateral. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 92-93. Preferen-
tial treatment would be given to ACP nations and non-ACP least-developed countries
and would be non-reciprocal. Id. The system would be more like a GSP. Id. The ACP
would cease to receive preferential treatment in the former ACP-EU partnership, while
creating a regime that conformed with WTO protocol. Id.
356. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 93. Such a reciprocity scheme would create a
Free Trade Area between developed and developing nations. Id. The disadvantage to
this idea would be that all ACP nations involved would be forced to devise a single plan
that considers varying trade patterns. Id.
357. See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 93-94; GREEN PAPER CHAPTER IV, supra note
354. There would be three regional agreements between the EU, Africa, the' Pacific'
islands and the Caribbean islands respectively. GREEN PAPER IV, supra note 354. Each
agreement would require uniform reciprocity, while tailoring itself to the needs and
conditions of each ACP region. Id. The disadvantage with such a regionalized scheme
is that the ACP nations must form a intra-regional, reciprocal FTA, which will take some
time, in addition to the time that it will take to establish such reciprocity with the EU.
Id. See Michael Moore, Globalizing Regionalism: A New Role for MERCOSUR in the Multilat-
eral Trading System, Nov. 28, 2000 at, http://www.wto.org/enlish/news-e/spmm-e/
spmm45_e.htm (explaining that regional trade agreements, in combination with multi-
lateral liberalization, can help developing countries, in particular, build upon their
comparative advantages, sharpen the efficiency of their industries, act as starting point
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III. IS THE BANANA REGIME REALLY DISCRININATORY AND
ILLEGAL?- AN ANAL YSIS
On the surface, there does not appear to be a grave incon-
sistency with the WTO's most recent ruling. Because the lan-
guage of Lom, IV explicitly waives the non-discriminatory and
non-reciprocity principles under Article I only, it cannot be ap-
plied where inconsistencies under Article XIII exist.3 58 Article
XIII ,calls for the equitable treatment of all contracting parties,
substantial and non-substantial, with regard to the allocation of
import restrictions on like products. 59 Based on the Panel's ra-
tionale, its rulings on the regime's non-conformity with GATT
were sound. The ruling does not mean that the EU's goals and
method of execution were unsound. The problem with this dis-
pute is more abstract in scope and, it appears, has been ignored
by the WTO.
A. Quantitative Restrictions versus Tariffs
Based on the rationale used in their 1997 and 1999 rulings,
the Panel and AB appeared uncomfortable with the idea of
quantitative restrictions. The use of quantitative restrictions as
part of the banana regime is an important sub-issue to this dis-
pute. Out of all the available forms of import restrictions, GATT
favors the use of tariffs.36 °
While the combination of a licensing system and a tariff sys-
tem is unnecessary according to GATT, quantitative restrictions
is problematic under a licensing system..361 As a result, the use of
quantitative restrictions is generally prohibited under GATT Ar-
for integration into world economy, as well as, focus and strengthen their political com-
mitment to open economy). But see Moore, supra (noting that regionalism carries risks;
coherence and predictability offered by multilateralism will weaken as governments
turn to regional agreements). Regionalism alone, without complementary multilateral
liberalization will create an unbalanced system, where rich countries are in the sphere
of control and developing countries are on the periphery. Moore, supra. While region-
alism, can be a positive force, both politically and economically, and complement the
multilateral system, it is not a substitute for a multilateral system. Id.
358. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text (explaining reason that Lom6
does not apply to GATT Article XIII).
359. See supra note 220 (discussing GATT Article XIII).
360. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining advantages and disad-
vantages of tariff use).
361. See supra notes 40 (discussing disadvantages of quantitative restrictions).
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ticle XI with explicit exceptions.36
2
The problem with prohibiting the use of quantitative restric-
tions in the EU banana regime is that many of the ACP import-
ers are not self-sufficient enough to compete in a tariff-only sys-
tem. 63 With a quota cap, the ACPs can integrate their bananas
into the market. A tariff-only system would flood the market
with bananas-more so with Latin American bananas. As a re-
sult, banana prices would decrease drastically. Given that Latin
American bananas are produced cheaply, Latin American ex-
porters and the United States are able to turn a profit more
quickly and thus benefit from a tariff-only system.3 64 The inde
pendent ACP farmers, meanwhile, produce their banana crops
at a greater expense and thus, earn less of a profit with low ba-
nana prices.365 Although preferential treatment by use of quan-
titative restrictions is generally prohibited under Article XI,
quantitative restrictions allow ACPs to compete in the market at
all. Since the ACPs stand to lose more than Latin American pro-
ducers because of the ACPs' high production costs, quantitative
restrictions allow ACPs the opportunity to increase their margi-
nal profits. 3 66
B. The Impact of the Lomg Waiver
Statistically, Lom6 IV has been unsuccessful, but its princi-
ple is still warranted. 67 Many critics of the Lom6 waiver argue
that the developing countries have not made significant progress
under Lom6 IV, while various European Member States still pre-
serve their individual interests, and their collective interests as a
community.368 Critics believe that ACPs should not depend
upon the EU and the EU common market for aid.369 They ar-
362. Id.
363. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining ACPs' need for quanti-
tative restrictions under EU bananas regime).
364. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing Latin American ba-
nana production advantages).
365. See supra note 175 (stating that ACP production costs are twice as expensive
as Latin American production costs).
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text (explaining that ACPs gained
marginal benefits under Lom6).
368. See supra note 155 (explaining other reasons for ACPs' alleged lack of pro-
gress under Lom6).
369. See supra note 152 (arguing that Lom( promotes permanent state of depen-
dency on developed nations).
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gue that the ACP nations should simply learn to tailor their ex-
port portfolios for free market competition. 70 This diversifica-
tion may be accomplished either by improving the quality of
their export commodities or by diversifying the types of com-
modities available for export, so as to effectively compete in the
market 37 1-akin to the notion that those most fit to survive in a
given competitive arena will do so.
In- addition to the statistical evidence that points to the ac-
tual economic impact of Lom6 IV, critics attribute several ab-
stract reasons for Lome's decline.3 72  Although there are
problems with Lom6 IV's effectiveness, adverse sociological, po-
litical and economic consequences will follow if the EU elimi-
nates the Lom6 waiver concept. 373 These adverse consequences
include a loss of jobs, which would lead to imminent, major,
socio-political disruption.174 The tourism industry, another ma-
jor source of income for many of the Caribbean countries, would
also suffer.37 5 Additional adverse consequences include the in-
crease of: the ACPs foreign debts, the ACPs' inability to pay off
their debts, the entrance into the drug trade by displaced, un-
skilled laborers, and U.S. emigration, which many U.S. oppo-
nents believe burdens the U.S. economy.3 76 Suggestions have
been made for ACPs to diversify their exports in order to acquire
their own comparative advantage. Many ACPs cannot simply di-
versify their exports in order to have a competitive advantage
depending on that nation's respective climate, terrain, and land
space.377
Proponents of Lom6 IV appear to justify its necessity in a
context that applies principles of international development
law.3 78 International law originally developed as a law of coexis-
370. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text (stating that ACPs should diver-
sify their exports products in order to develop market comparative advantage).
371. Id.
372. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (stating reasons for Lome's
alleged lack of economic effect).
373. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining ACPs' view of conse-
quences that will result from elimination of Lom6 preferences).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See supra note 121 (discussing why Caribbean nations cannot diversify their
exports and must depend on bananas as principle commodity).
378. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining concept of international
development law).
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tence between separate, but equal, states based on the idea of
reciprocity.179 With the devastation of World War II, a need for
cooperation among European nations gave way to the develop-
ment of international organizations and international laws that
would foster the gradual formation of the EU." 0 Under this new
law of international cooperation, participants have an obligation
to act on a multilateral level."' More specifically, states must
adhere to rules based on a common concern for growth as an
international community, and the preservation of an individual
state's citizens: 82 Lom6 IV advances the goal of international
development law, which evolved from a concern about intrastate
affairs to a concern about the community-wide initiatives to at-
tain a higher standard of living and development for all. 83
Not every Member State is the same economically and so-
cially speaking. Therefore, a state's ability to fulfill obligations
under the law may not be as easily achieved. In the present case,
countries that were former European colonies have only gained
their independence with the last twenty to thirty years. These
countries are still in the process of their industrialization-if
they are participants in the process at all. These countries must
adjust their economies in order to be on equal footing and effec-
tively compete with countries that have been industrialized for
the past century. In order to accomplish this, some form of assis-
tance, such as elements found in the current banana regime, is
very necessary. Lom6 IV and its predecessors allowed these de-
veloping countries a chance to enter the international trade
sphere at some reasonable level of competitiveness.
Detractors against the EU banana regime argue that prefer-
ential treatment under Lom6 IV is discriminatory on the face of
the MFN clause and only fosters a welfare state of dependency.
They also argue that the EU banana regime does not promote a
379. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining concept of international
law).
380. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (describing post World War II
revitalization plan).
381. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that international devel-
opment law requires multilateral cooperation from trade participants).
382. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing concepts and goals of
globalization requiring growth as whole community particular attention paid to eco-
nomically impoverished participants).
383. See supra notes 138-146, 156-158 (discussing LomCs role in connection with
international development law).
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competitive free market, which is the foundation of Western eco-
nomics and international law, therefore, they conclude that such
preferential treatment is unfair and illegal.
The Lom6 waiver did not abandon the notion of fair com-
petition, but simply modified the means needed to achieve the
goal of an equal and fair opportunity to compete effectively.
The principle of equal treatment in competitive trade still exists,
but the process has been adjusted to grant different rights and
obligations to different Member States based on that state's de-
gree of social and economic progress thus far.384 International
organizations all agree that states should cooperate with one an-
other to foster worldwide economic growth, especially for less
developed nations.
Under international law, every country has the right to de-
termine the structure of its respective economic system whether
by granting special privileges or some other form of equal treat-
ment across the board. A contracting party is not legally obli-
gated to impose equal treatment under international law. The
only recourse lies in the MFN clause, but the MFN clause is con-
sidered a voluntary, contractual rule and not a rule under inter-
national law.38 5 Thus, the rules of international law, which sup-
ports short-term preferential treatment in favor of equality in the
long run, seem to and should override the principles espoused
by the MFN clause when it comes to international trade and in-
ternational development law in the 21st century. Preferential
treatment is not discriminatory where it seeks to rectify and bal-
ance a pre-existing unbalanced situation. Therefore, the princi-
ple of the MFN clause is not appropriate in the case at bar and
was rightfully waived by Lom6 IV. However valid the MFN prin-
ciple may be for the regulation of trade relations among more
industrialized nations of equal economic potency, indeed, it is
unsuitable for trade involving countries of vastly disparate eco-
nomic strengths.
The most effective and logical resolution to the banana dis-
pute would be to preserve the Lom6 waiver for another five to
ten years until the EU and the ACPs are ready to enter into re-
384. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing how international law ad-
dresses ideals of level competitive field under international development law).
385. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining basic concept of MFN
clause).
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gionalized, cooperative FTAs with each other."8 6 Each ACP re-
gion would tailor a unique plan with the EU, which benefits the
ACPs, while establishing a system of uniform reciprocity as per
the language of GATT. 87 The reason for the preservation of the
Lom6 waiver until a transition to an FTA is made considers that
not every ACP nation is ready to handle such an immediate tran-
sition based on that country's particular economic and socio-po-
litical scheme. 8
CONCLUSION
The banana dispute has evolved into a very complicated and
controversial issue that may or may not have an immediate reso-
lution. Or, does such a resolution exist, but interested parties
want to ignore it in order to preserve their own self-interests?
Social development and cooperation comes with tolerance, pa-
tience, and understanding-terminology that is not frequently
used to dissect complex issues of international trade and eco-
nomics. But in fact, this type of thinking is vital to the case at
bar. Given the predicted consequences, the banana dispute is
an example of the most complex issues globalization has
brought to the forefront. Although it seems like the recent de-
velopments in the dispute only attempt a small amount of pro-
gress, it must be remembered that credible solutions do not
guarantee that economic change and prosperity for developing
third-world nations will be immediate or will even occur at all.
Much of the world embraces the tenets of free market capi-
talism. In the wake of globalization and international economic
development, the explicit rules of free market capitalism and
popular Western economics should be set aside. This is in order
to assist those countries that are generally seen as less desirable
and not advanced, but, at one point, were considered so essen-
tial to the reality of globalization and the restoration of the
world's present economic superpowers.
Was there ever a true or even altruistic purpose behind
globalization? Or is globalization the economic superpowers'
fumbled attempt at a remorseful gesture to its former colonies
386. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (discussing advantages and disad-
vantages of regionalized cooperative agreement).
387. Id.
388. Id.
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for their being the have-nots of a world so laden with technology
and resources, no one nation should really be considered a have-
not. Is globalization simply being retarded by those who want to
exist in a world of free market competition-where alliances are
formed for the sake of later trumping supposed allies when their
purpose has been exhausted?
In the wake of these questions, regionalism, perhaps under
a looser multilateral scheme, is the best way to go. Countries can
form trading blocs with each other because of their shared geo-
graphic location and economic interests, while perhaps, compet-
ing with other nations, beyond the trading bloc, on a less inten-
sively multilateral level. With this a more profound degree of
free market competition would be preserved, but that degree of
competition would be on a more micro-economic level. There is
no clear answer to this issue, but one must be found soon.
The ultimate winners cannot be predicted at this point-if
there are any real winners to the banana war. The real losers
should include all the parties to this dispute. The EU, the
United States and even the WTO should be criticized for letting
this issue fester for this long. The developing and least devel-
oped nations, who are pretty much stuck in the middle of this
dispute, stand to lose the most, out of all parties involved, be-
cause they never had a true voice or a genuine advocate to cham-
pion their cause loudly enough. We have some choices here:
level the trading field, so that everyone has a chance to walk
away with a piece of globalization; sectionalize the trading field
in order for participants to compete with their respective equals
without compromising to weaker competitors too much; or re-
main at status quo where an economic headache and embarrass-
ment is all that has been and will be gained from such non-coop-
eration.
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